

Why Is NATO and The Kiev Regime Terrified of Russia's 'Zircon' Hypersonic Missile?

By [Drago Bosnic](#)

Global Research, March 29, 2024

Region: [Europe](#), [Russia and FSU](#)

Theme: [Intelligence](#), [Military](#) and [WMD](#)

In-depth Report: [UKRAINE REPORT](#)

All Global Research articles can be read in 51 languages by activating the Translate Website button below the author's name (only available in desktop version).

To receive Global Research's Daily Newsletter (selected articles), [click here](#).

Click the share button above to email/forward this article to your friends and colleagues. Follow us on [Instagram](#) and [Twitter](#) and subscribe to our [Telegram Channel](#). Feel free to repost and share widely Global Research articles.

[Global Research Fundraising: Stop the Pentagon's Ides of March](#)

Even before [the horrendous Crocus City Hall terrorist attack](#), the Russian military's [long-range strike capabilities](#) were sending shivers down the spines of NATO aggressors and their Neo-Nazi junta puppets.

Weapons such as the 3M22 "Zircon", a scramjet-powered hypersonic cruise missile, have been inducted into service in recent years and are [now also being transferred to land-based platforms](#), specifically the K300P "Bastion-P" coastal defense system. With a 1500 km range (perhaps even more) and Mach 9 speed, the "Zircon" is over 3 times faster and its range is at least double that of the P-800 "Oniks" supersonic missiles originally used by the aforementioned platform, further enhancing [Russia's already unprecedented long-range strike capabilities](#) (to both the Neo-Nazi junta's and NATO's horror, as previously mentioned).

This has become even more noticeable in the aftermath of the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack, as the Russian military is now hunting for [the organizers, both the Kiev regime's intelligence services and their NATO overlords](#).

With such a range (at least 1500 km or possibly even beyond 2000 km), the usage of "Zircon" allows Moscow to target any location on the territory of Ukraine.

However, it should be noted that the Eurasian giant always had this ability.

The difference now is that it can do so much faster and with far less warning time. The usage of air-launched and ground-based hypersonic missile systems such as the 9-A-7660 "Kinzhal" and "Iskander-M" [is still very much relevant](#), as evidenced by the [latest](#)

[elimination of high-ranking NATO officers](#) (although their deaths will surely be attributed to “sudden” skiing accidents).

However, the “Iskander-M” can use a massive 700 kg HE warhead that is best used against frontline targets and higher concentrations of troops [in the rear](#).

Virtually the same goes for much faster “Kinzhal” missiles. In addition, these can sometimes be detected by NATO ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) assets, particularly airborne and space-based, giving the Neo-Nazi junta officers and their foreign “advisers” just enough time to run away (albeit not much and certainly not always). The launch of an “Iskander” can be detected by early warning systems, while ISR can pick up the MiG-31K/I deployment. This information can be relayed to the Kiev regime or any NATO personnel on the ground. On the other hand, detecting a scramjet-powered “Zircon” can be a lot more problematic.

Then the numbers come into play:

- Kiev: 3 minutes 30 seconds;
- Lvov: 5 minutes 20 seconds;
- Dnepropetrovsk: 2 minutes 30 seconds;
- Vinnitsa: 3 minutes 40 seconds;
- Kharkov: less than 4 minutes;
- Odessa: less than 1 minute.

Imagine being an officer of the SBU, GUR (Neo-Nazi junta’s military intelligence) or some of the NATO occupation forces.

You’re stationed in a building, living in the illusion that you’re safe when the Russian SVR or GRU learns about your location and relays this information to units in Crimea who then fire a “Zircon” at that building.

This is how much time you’d have before impact. However, let’s consider the best-case scenario and imagine that NATO ISR assets detect the missile immediately after launch (which is extremely improbable). This is how much time you’d have to evacuate. Is it possible to run away in time? Certainly, but that doesn’t mean it’s very likely. On the contrary, the sheer panic resulting from a warning would surely make the evacuation a lot more difficult. [The same goes for the “Kinzhal” and “Iskander” missile launches](#).

However, the primary reason why the “Zircon” is a lot more dangerous for high-value targets (HVTs) in the rear is because it has a much smaller warhead (around 300 kg), meaning that the Russian military is more likely to use it in long-range strikes.

Firing an “Iskander” or “Kinzhal” could cause unacceptable damage to purely civilian infrastructure in the surrounding areas, both due to their larger and more destructive warheads, particularly in the case of “Kinzhal”, with the speed also giving it massive kinetic energy.

That’s why these more destructive missile systems are far likelier to be used against purely military targets such as [large troop concentrations](#) and important hostile equipment, [particularly SAM \(surface-to-air missile\) systems](#) and [MLRS \(multiple launch rocket systems\) known to use PGMs](#) (precision-guided munitions), etc.

On the other hand, precisely because of the large-scale deployment of “Zircon” missiles, Russia has more options to strike decision-making centers in Ukraine.

This explains [the panic in NATO and the Pentagon](#), which are now in a dilemma about how to ensure the safety of their occupation forces in Ukraine.

I suggest everyone watch closely for news about the “sudden deaths” of NATO officers in various “freak accidents” in the coming days and weeks.

Still, the Kiev regime insists there’s nothing to worry about, [as it can “shoot down anything”](#).

Namely, [according to their latest claims](#), they’ve “shot down at least two ‘Zircon’ missiles”.

Expectedly, the Neo-Nazi junta insists they’ve achieved this with “US-made missile defense systems over Kyiv, on March 25”.

The report never named any system specifically, but it can be assumed that future claims will attribute the supposed “kill” to the atrociously overhyped “Patriot” SAM that has been [failing everywhere for the last 30+ years](#), even against rather primitive ballistic missiles, but is “suddenly so successful” against the latest hypersonic ones. In addition, it’s rather interesting how they can “achieve” that, but have been absolutely helpless against over 300 P-800 “Oniks” missiles. Not a single one has been shot down, despite being 3-4 times slower and less maneuverable than the “Zircon”.

*

Note to readers: Please click the share button above. Follow us on Instagram and Twitter and subscribe to our Telegram Channel. Feel free to repost and share widely Global Research articles.

This article was originally published on [InfoBrics](#).

[Drago Bosnic](#) is an independent geopolitical and military analyst. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

Featured image is from InfoBrics

The original source of this article is Global Research
Copyright © [Drago Bosnic](#), Global Research, 2024

[Comment on Global Research Articles on our Facebook page](#)

[Become a Member of Global Research](#)

Articles by: [Drago Bosnic](#)

not be responsible for any inaccurate or incorrect statement in this article. The Centre of Research on Globalization grants permission to cross-post Global Research articles on community internet sites as long the source and copyright are acknowledged together with a hyperlink to the original Global Research article. For publication of Global Research articles in print or other forms including commercial internet sites, contact: publications@globalresearch.ca

www.globalresearch.ca contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available to our readers under the provisions of "fair use" in an effort to advance a better understanding of political, economic and social issues. The material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving it for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material for purposes other than "fair use" you must request permission from the copyright owner.

For media inquiries: publications@globalresearch.ca