

Armenia and the South Caucasus' "Pandora's Box". Pushing both Turkey and Iran against Russia?

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Global Research, September 25, 2023

Region: [Europe](#)

Theme: [Intelligence](#)

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Geopolitics of the South Caucasus were already extremely complicated in the years before the political West staged yet another coup in the post-Soviet space and brought the infamous Sorosite Nikol Pashinyan to power.

[What Western powers were hoping to achieve is to drag Russia into a new conflict](#), this time right on the border of the ever-volatile (albeit mostly peaceful in recent years) Northern Caucasus, a region that has the potential to unleash a geopolitical firestorm that could reach even Russia's "soft underbelly" (regions northwest and north of Kazakhstan). And yet, for now, the only thing they've accomplished is the very possible opening of yet another geopolitical Pandora's box that could deeply destabilize not only the Middle East and Caucasus, but also Central Asia.

[With his suicidal foreign policy pivot toward the West](#), Pashinyan is about to turn Armenia's only two allies in the region (Russia and Iran) into enemies, while acquiring no allies whatsoever.

His hopes of having Georgia change its stance are absolutely futile, as Tbilisi will not risk possible bad relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. And the reason is pure realpolitik, since Georgia's relations with Russia are limited to tense neutrality at best, primarily due to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which it sees as its own breakaway provinces. This leaves only Baku and Ankara as two primary regional partners, both in geopolitical and economic terms, although economic ties with Russia are substantial and growing (but you'll never hear Tbilisi brag about it, since it's "bad for democracy").

As Armenia is simply not important enough for Georgia to risk anything, Yerevan's strategic position has worsened considerably. This only shows the level of Pashinyan's geopolitical skill (or better said, the complete lack thereof). However, as Artsakh (the native Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh) is now lost, pressure on Armenia is bound to reach a boiling point. With its mortal enemies Azerbaijan and Turkey to the east and west, respectively,

Yerevan's only possible ally that borders it is Iran (or at least it was before 2018). But Tehran is one of the US-led political West's primary targets and [Pashinyan's suicidal subservience to the belligerent power pole](#) has effectively destroyed any chances for an alliance with Iran, as it will simply never have more than superficially cordial relations with a NATO vassal.

Worse yet, as we all know now, [Pashinyan also effectively destroyed Armenia's alliance with Russia](#), the only power that could protect Yerevan from any external threat.

In fact, Moscow's troops are the sole reason Armenia is an independent country (or at least it was before Pashinyan). So, once again, he somehow managed to not just lose two of Yerevan's only allies, but is now in the process of turning them into enemies, while acquiring zero new friends. The best he has is the same Armenia had before – a formally neutral Georgia that actively works with Turkey and Azerbaijan, allowing the transfer of all Turkish weapons to Baku, the same ones that have been used in Artsakh for the last several years. In other words, if you ever feel stupid, just type in "Nikol Pashinyan" in your browser and hit "images".

On the other hand, this isn't where the South Caucasus Pandora's box bad omens end. Far worse, the geopolitical firestorm unleashed by Sorosites can set the entire region (and beyond) on fire.

Namely, [as Turkey's Neo-Ottoman ambitions are hitting wall after wall across the Middle East](#), be it in Libya, Egypt or Syria, Armenia is left as the only option for expansion.

Its complete destruction is not merely an emotional desire based on a burning historical hatred, but an actual geopolitical possibility that opens the gates of Central Asia for Ankara, the ultimate prize and dream of every pan-Turkist. The fact that Armenia needs to be eliminated to achieve that is only seen as a bonus. This is also highly beneficial to NATO, as it's bound to push Russia and Turkey into direct rivalry in Central Asia.

Thus, Yerevan only serves as a cheap pawn for the political West. Even in the extremely unlikely case that Georgia is pressured into changing its stance toward Armenia, the latter could never become a NATO member, a belligerent military alliance in which Turkey has been one of the most prominent members since 1952. In addition, [if Ankara has been giving Sweden so much trouble when it comes to NATO membership](#), what does Yerevan hope to achieve? It might as well launch a space program, since its chances of becoming the first nation to reach Mars are far higher than joining NATO anytime soon (or ever). In addition, despite the current crawling hostility between Washington DC and Ankara, the United States will never push Turkey out of NATO, especially not for the sake of Armenia.

Yerevan's best bet is to urgently get rid of NATO puppets installed in 2018 and save whatever's left of its alliance with Russia. It should also turn to Iran and try to build closer ties with it, as Tehran is not very keen to see a giant pan-Turkic bloc emerge on its northwestern borders, [especially not one dominated by prominent NATO members](#) and close Israeli allies. Not to mention its possible extension into Central Asia, particularly the potential inclusion of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This could also partially explain the recent surge in military contacts between Russia and Iran, as both need to coordinate their efforts in the South Caucasus and elsewhere.

It would be wise for Armenia to capitalize on this, but it requires an independent leadership

and capable diplomatic establishment, both of which were lost in 2018. There's still time, although it's running out fast. Sorosite Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan [recently called for UN peacekeepers to be sent to Artsakh](#), but that's effectively impossible, as Azerbaijan controls all corridors that connect Artsakh and Armenia, Lachin included. There's not a single reason why Baku would allow such deployments. Once again, no matter how this geopolitical equation is set up, this leaves only one option for Yerevan – Russia.

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This article was originally published on [InfoBrics](#).

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