

# Voting Machines and Electoral Results in Florida: The Statistical Evidence

By [Global Research](#)

Global Research, November 12, 2004

[ustogether.org](http://ustogether.org) 12 November 2004

Region: [USA](#)

In-depth Report: [Election Fraud in America](#)

## Editor's note

we bring to the attention of our readers, the incisive analysis of Kathy Dopp, who carefully analyzed the Florida election results, the day after. Also included are further statistical analyses of Elizabeth Liddle and Josh Mitteldorf.

## PART I

### Surprising Pattern of Florida's Election Results

by Kathy Dopp

Wednesday November 3, 2004

**Look at the Percent Change columns.**

**Notice how the percents vary much more widely in the Op-Scan counties versus the Touchscreen counties.**

Explanation, Sources, and Graphical Plots are Below the Chart

[Voting Machine Type by County 2004](#)

**New! [Cross-party voting in Florida seems to depend on the local voting technology](#)**

While the heavily scrutinized touch-screen voting machines seemed to produce results in which the registered Democrat/Republican ratios largely matched the Kerry/Bush vote, in Florida's counties using optically scanned paper ballots the results seem to contain anomalies. Mathematicians are interested in investigating the November 2004 election because if exit polls from various states use the same scientific methodology, then the likelihood of election results being significantly different than exit polls results in half a dozen swing states is very very low. By the 2006 election, we need by county exit polls to do a better analysis.

Note: This is a scientific study. Small op-scan counties must be excluded for valid analysis. This relationship with voting machines is statistically significant. No conclusions as to the causes of the pattern can be drawn at this time. I am putting my ideas for [a complete study](#) out to statisticians and programmers to be able to fully analyze 2004 election results beginning with Florida, so that we can develop and test the efficacy of a system to put in place by 2006 to pinpoint counties or even precincts which warrant recounts.

[Please Subscribe to our mail list](#) for updates and to learn how you can help this project. With your help, we can put measures in place by 2006 to [find patterns allowing us to pinpoint possible election rigging/hacking/innocent-errors](#) by the day after the election, so that

candidates will immediately know if precincts or counties need to be recounted prior to conceding.

## **E-Touch Voting**

**(%Regist)\*(TotalVotes)**

**(Actual-Exp)/(Exp)**

**COUNTY**

**vendor**

**REGISTERED VOTERS**

**ACTUAL RESULTS**

**EXPECTED\_VOTES**

**PERCENT CHANGE**

**%REP**

**%DEM**

**TOT\_REG**

**REP**

**DEM**

**TOT\_VOTES**

**REP**

**DEM**

**REP**

**DEM**

Broward

ES&S

26.8%

50.5%

1,058,069

236,794

441,733

686,715

184,152

346,565

28.6%

27.5%

Charlotte

ES&S

44.9%  
31.9%  
113,808  
44,402  
34,227  
79,730  
35,806  
25,435  
24.0%  
34.6%

Collier  
ES&S  
53.1%  
24.4%  
168,673  
82,493  
43,277  
126,916  
67,388  
30,912  
22.4%  
40.0%

Hillsborough  
Sequoia  
35.1%  
41.7%  
621,201  
241,630  
210,892  
455,970  
159,843  
190,023  
51.2%  
11.0%

Indian River  
Sequoia  
51.3%  
30.0%  
81,643  
36,744  
23,850  
61,087  
31,325  
18,343  
17.3%  
30.0%

Lake

ES&S  
47.4%  
34.3%  
161,269  
73,971  
47,963  
123,269  
58,388  
42,237  
26.7%  
13.6%

Lee  
ES&S  
47.5%  
29.7%  
304,937  
114,153  
76,874  
193,326  
91,895  
57,513  
24.2%  
33.7%

Martin  
ES&S  
52.5%  
27.5%  
98,857  
41,303  
30,149  
72,334  
37,953  
19,905  
8.8%  
51.5%

Miami-Dade  
ES&S  
34.8%  
42.8%  
1,058,801  
326,362  
383,032  
713,022  
248,045  
305,486  
31.6%  
25.4%

Nassau  
ES&S  
49.1%  
36.8%  
41,353  
23,726  
8,543  
32,656  
16,031  
12,017  
48.0%  
-28.9%

Palm Beach  
Sequoia  
32.0%  
45.1%  
729,575  
174,233  
275,030  
452,061  
144,679  
204,000  
20.4%  
34.8%

Pasco  
ES&S  
40.1%  
37.3%  
265,974  
103,195  
84,729  
190,861  
76,531  
71,237  
34.8%  
18.9%

Pinellas  
Sequoia  
39.2%  
37.8%  
590,989  
222,630  
222,103  
448,875  
175,947  
169,789  
26.5%

30.8%

Sarasota

ES&S

47.9%

31.2%

240,592

104,446

88,225

195,183

93,552

60,833

11.6%

45.0%

Sumter

ES&S

43.5%

40.8%

40,523

19,794

11,583

31,835

13,851

13,004

42.9%

-10.9%

5,576,264

1,845,876

1,982,210

3,863,840

1,435,385

1,567,297

## Op-Scan Precinct

**(%Regist)\*(TotalVotes)**

**(Actual-Exp)/(Exp)**

**COUNTY**

**vendor**

**REGISTERED VOTERS**

**ACTUAL RESULTS**

**EXPECTED\_VOTES**

**PERCENT CHANGE**

**%REP**

**%DEM**

**TOT\_REG**

**REP**

**DEM**

**TOT\_VOTES**

**REP**

**DEM**

**REP**

**DEM**

Alachua

Diebold

27.8%

50.5%

142,358

47,615

62,348

111,022

30,887

56,111

54.2%

11.1%

Baker

Sequoia

24.3%

69.3%

12,887

7,738

2,180

9,955

2,415

6,895

220.4%

-68.4%

Bay

ES&S

44.2%

39.2%

101,315

53,305  
21,034  
74,890  
33,079  
29,351  
61.1%  
-28.3%

Bradford  
ES&S  
28.3%  
61.4%  
14,721  
7,553  
3,244  
10,851  
3,072  
6,663  
145.8%  
-51.3%

Brevard  
Diebold  
44.8%  
36.5%  
338,195  
152,838  
110,153  
265,075  
118,772  
96,860  
28.7%  
13.7%

Calhoun  
Diebold  
11.9%  
82.4%  
8,350  
3,780  
2,116  
5,961  
709  
4,911  
433.2%  
-56.9%

Citrus  
Diebold  
41.5%  
38.9%



90,780  
39,496  
29,271  
69,457  
28,809  
27,039  
37.1%  
8.3%

Clay  
ES&S  
56.5%  
25.6%  
106,464  
61,813  
18,887  
81,144  
45,877  
20,794  
34.7%  
-9.2%

Columbia  
Diebold  
31.3%  
56.5%  
34,282  
16,753  
8,029  
24,984  
7,825  
14,119  
114.1%  
-43.1%

DeSoto  
Diebold  
25.4%  
59.3%  
14,901  
5,510  
3,910  
9,493  
2,413  
5,630  
128.4%  
-30.6%

Dixie  
Diebold  
15.0%

77.5%  
9,676  
4,433  
1,959  
6,440  
968  
4,988  
358.1%  
-60.7%

Duval  
Diebold  
36.9%  
46.2%  
515,202  
218,476  
157,624  
378,330  
139,605  
174,965  
56.5%  
-9.9%

Escambia  
ES&S  
43.8%  
40.7%  
189,833  
93,311  
48,207  
142,895  
62,602  
58,149  
49.1%  
-17.1%

Flagler  
Diebold  
40.7%  
38.1%  
47,068  
19,624  
18,563  
38,455  
15,669  
14,657  
25.2%  
26.6%

Franklin  
ES&S

15.9%  
77.3%  
7,620  
3,472  
2,400  
5,930  
943  
4,586  
268.1%  
-47.7%

Gadsden

ES&S  
11.2%  
82.9%  
26,884  
6,236  
14,610  
20,948  
2,347  
17,361  
165.7%  
-15.8%

Gilchrist

Diebold  
30.4%  
58.6%  
9,035  
4,930  
2,015  
7,007  
2,133  
4,106  
131.2%  
-50.9%

Glades

Diebold  
24.8%  
64.8%  
5,963  
1,983  
1,434  
3,434  
852  
2,227  
132.8%  
-35.6%

Gulf  
ES&S  
26.6%  
67.1%  
9,627  
4,797  
2,398  
7,259  
1,928  
4,874  
148.8%  
-50.8%

Hamilton  
ES&S  
14.9%  
78.9%  
7,645  
2,786  
2,252  
5,065  
755  
3,994  
268.9%  
-43.6%

Hardee  
Diebold  
26.7%  
63.8%  
10,399  
5,047  
2,147  
7,245  
1,936  
4,619  
160.7%  
-53.5%

Hendry  
ES&S  
30.8%  
56.5%  
17,144  
5,756  
3,960  
9,774  
3,010  
5,523  
91.3%

-28.3%

Hernando

Diebold

41.3%

38.8%

109,656

40,137

35,006

75,832

31,303

29,428

28.2%

19.0%

Highlands

ES&S

44.5%

39.8%

60,176

20,475

12,986

33,687

14,976

13,401

36.7%

-3.1%

Holmes

ES&S

21.3%

72.7%

10,982

6,410

1,810

8,298

1,771

6,036

261.9%

-70.0%

Jackson

ES&S

22.0%

71.5%

27,138

12,092

7,529

19,750

4,339

14,127

178.7%  
-46.7%

Jefferson  
Diebold  
20.7%  
72.3%  
9,300  
3,298  
4,134  
7,477  
1,551  
5,408  
112.7%  
-23.6%

Lafayette  
ES&S  
13.2%  
82.8%  
4,309  
2,460  
845  
3,325  
440  
2,755  
459.3%  
-69.3%

Leon  
Diebold  
26.6%  
57.1%  
171,182  
47,902  
79,591  
128,316  
34,165  
73,214  
40.2%  
8.7%

Levy  
Diebold  
27.6%  
59.7%  
22,617  
10,408  
6,073  
16,649  
4,594

9,940  
126.5%  
-38.9%

Liberty  
ES&S  
7.9%  
88.3%  
4,075  
1,927  
1,070  
3,021  
237  
2,667  
712.3%  
-59.9%

Madison  
Diebold  
14.9%  
79.5%  
11,371  
4,195  
4,048  
8,306  
1,238  
6,605  
238.8%  
-38.7%

Manatee  
Diebold  
44.3%  
33.0%  
191,635  
81,237  
61,193  
143,469  
63,489  
47,394  
28.0%  
29.1%

Marion  
ES&S  
43.2%  
39.7%  
184,257  
81,235  
57,225  
139,581

60,279  
55,427  
34.8%  
3.2%

Monroe  
Diebold  
38.7%  
36.1%  
51,377  
19,457  
19,646  
39,517  
15,286  
14,278  
27.3%  
37.6%

Okaloosa  
Diebold  
57.2%  
24.7%  
127,455  
69,320  
19,276  
89,288  
51,059  
22,085  
35.8%  
-12.7%

Okeechobee  
Diebold  
29.7%  
58.5%  
18,627  
6,975  
5,150  
12,184  
3,622  
7,124  
92.6%  
-27.7%

Orange  
ES&S  
35.1%  
40.2%  
531,774  
191,389  
192,030



385,547  
135,299  
154,938  
41.5%  
23.9%

Osceola  
Diebold  
32.8%  
40.2%  
129,487  
32,812  
30,295  
63,440  
20,804  
25,508  
57.7%  
18.8%

Polk  
Diebold  
39.0%  
42.6%  
295,742  
123,457  
85,923  
210,642  
82,059  
89,651  
50.4%  
-4.2%

Putnam  
Diebold  
28.1%  
57.7%  
45,344  
18,303  
12,407  
30,960  
8,690  
17,878  
110.6%  
-30.6%

Santa Rosa  
ES&S  
55.9%  
28.1%  
96,359  
51,952

14,635  
67,175  
37,543  
18,880  
38.4%  
-22.5%

Seminole  
Diebold  
44.6%  
32.3%  
241,230  
107,913  
76,802  
185,762  
82,869  
60,037  
30.2%  
27.9%

St.Johns  
Diebold  
53.3%  
28.3%  
109,635  
58,802  
26,215  
85,699  
45,678  
24,272  
28.7%  
8.0%

St.Lucie  
Diebold  
36.6%  
41.4%  
137,951  
38,919  
43,367  
82,798  
30,272  
34,288  
28.6%  
26.5%

Suwannee  
ES&S  
26.8%  
63.6%  
21,930

11,145  
4,513  
15,785  
4,236  
10,035  
163.1%  
-55.0%

Taylor  
Diebold  
18.9%  
75.6%  
11,481  
5,466  
3,049  
8,580  
1,622  
6,486  
237.1%  
-53.0%

Union  
ES&S  
18.3%  
75.5%  
7,063  
3,396  
1,251  
4,675  
855  
3,529  
297.4%  
-64.5%

Volusia  
Diebold  
35.9%  
40.8%  
309,930  
100,209  
106,853  
208,410  
74,891  
85,000  
33.8%  
25.7%

Wakulla  
Diebold  
24.2%  
66.9%

15,396  
6,777  
4,896  
11,763  
2,850  
7,864  
137.8%  
-37.7%

Walton  
Diebold  
50.1%  
36.8%  
32,777  
17,526  
6,205  
23,939  
11,987  
8,802  
46.2%  
-29.5%

Washington  
Diebold  
25.4%  
67.0%  
14,421  
7,367  
2,911  
10,363  
2,634  
6,947  
179.6%  
-58.1%

4,725,026  
1,950,213  
1,445,675  
3,419,852  
1,337,242  
1,432,425

Note: Election Results were taken on Nov 3, when the Florida vote was 98.6% in and the Voter Registration Numbers are from 10-04.

**Explanation of What these numbers are, and how they were calculated:**

PERCENT CHANGE for DEM, for example, = (Actual DEM Vote - Expected DEM Vote) / (Expected DEM Vote)

This is a simple *percent change* measure taught in highschool mathematics.

EXPECTED\_VOTES REP = the percentage of registered REP \* the total number of voters who voted in each county on Tuesday.

EXPECTED votes would normally vary from the ACTUAL votes due to increased voter turnout by one party, Independents voting REP or DEM or other factors. What seems very odd in these numbers is that the increase in ACTUAL votes from EXPECTED votes has a striking pattern of being so much higher for REPs than that for DEMs in counties using optical scan voting machines, even when smaller counties are excluded from the analysis.

<http://enight.dos.state.fl.us/> and <http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voterreg/index.shtml> for registered voters by county and election results by county  
<http://vevo.verifiedvoting.org/verifier/> for voting machine type by county

### **Statistical Analysis and Visual Charts of the Data**

#### [Graphical Plots of FL 2004 Data](#)

Simple pictures of counties by voting machine type - [Op Scan- Precinct Counties](#) and [Touchscreen Counties](#)

#### [Statistical Significance FL 2004 & Graph](#)

#### [Pearson's Correlations FL 2004](#)

[Interesting but Not Rigorous](#) because the data was plotted using counties with smaller population.

### **Criticisms of Our Work & Our Responses**

An analyses of our data [http://synapse.princeton.edu/~sam/royle\\_florida.html](http://synapse.princeton.edu/~sam/royle_florida.html) which neglected to remove smaller counties from the study before doing the analyses and so is not a valid critique of our analyses but is interesting. Here is another [critique of our analyses by Poli Scientists](#) and explanations of why these Cornell interpretations aren't supported by the data by [Elizabeth Liddle](#) and [Marc Sapir](#) and [Kathy Dopp](#) .

### **Other Election Results by County:**

#### [Florida Presidential 2000](#)

#### [Pennsylvania Presidential 2004](#)

**An open source election and vote-counting system** with voter verifiable paper ballot and two independently-programmed, always-reconciled [ballot counting system that needs your support.](#)

[Voters nationally voted along party lines by about 90%](#) and Florida exit polls favored Kerry. [Interesting manipulations have been done to the exit polls after the election](#) to change their results. Further study is needed of other numerical by county measures for Florida and other states' election results and races. This site was mentioned in a [http://www.house.gov/judiciary\\_democrats/goinvestvote2004ltr11504.pdf](http://www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/goinvestvote2004ltr11504.pdf) letter from three congressmen to the GAO urging an investigation.


And an interesting [look at this data](#) from Florida.

Truthout and Thom Hartman of CommonDreams is covering us. [http://www.truthout.org/docs\\_04/110804Z.shtml](http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/110804Z.shtml)

## **PART 2**

### **2004 Presidential Florida By County By Voting Machine Type Election Analysis**

**by Elizabeth Liddle**

This analysis is derived from the above tables presented by Kathy Dopp [this Florida Election Data.](#) 

Op-scan machines tended to be used in counties with small numbers of registered voters, while very largest counties tended to use E-touch, so that the entire two groups of counties (E-touch and Op-scan users in Florida) cannot be validly compared, as county-size itself might account for the data. However, for the 26 mid-sized counties with between 80,000 and 500,000 registered voters, the type of machine used was not significantly related to the number of registered voters in the county. Eight of these counties used E-touch machines, and 18 used Op-scan machines. There was no significant difference between these two groups of counties in either their numbers of registered voters or their proportion of registered Republicans to registered Democrats. Neither covariate was a significant predictor of change. However, "machine used" was very significant ( $p < .01$ ), with Op scan favoring republics.

An analysis of variance (ANOVA) conducted on the percent change for each party ([Actual vote minus expected vote]/expected vote) in each county, with "machine type" as a predictive factor, indicated that machine type was a significant predictor of percent change in voting. Counties using E-touch machines showed significantly positive percent changes in vote for both Republican and Democrat candidates, with greater mean percent changes for the Democrat. However counties using Op-scan machines showed significant positive percent change only for the Republican candidate, the mean change for the Democrat being insignificantly greater than zero.

Caveats: The number of counties is small, and the groups unequal in size; this means that the probability of the results occurring by chance may be somewhat greater than quoted. It is also possible that a county's choice of machine or voting pattern may be influenced by a third factor that also influenced voter behaviour. The magnitude of the apparent effect of voting machine type on voter behaviour nonetheless would seem to warrant investigation.

## **PART 3**

### **Cross-party voting in Florida seems to depend on the local voting technology**

**by Josh Mitteldorf**

The day after the election, [Kathy Dopp](#) noticed a pattern in Florida's voting that seemed to relate to the type of voting machine used in each county (see data above). Nationwide, exit polls showed that 90% of party-registered voters tend to vote for the party to which they are registered. In Florida '04, counties that used electronic touch-screen voting showed a shift from this expectation toward Kerry; but among counties that used opti-scan paper ballots, there was a shift toward Bush.

One [suggested explanation](#) for this pattern was that it was small counties that haven't yet made the switch to electronic technologies, and in these areas "Dixiecrats" tend to register Democrat for local elections, but vote Republican in national elections. To test this hypothesis, [Elizabeth Liddle](#) refined Dopp's study, eliminating the smallest counties, all of which used the opti-scan technology, and also the largest counties, which tended to use the touch-screen machines. There remained 26 mid-size counties, 8 of which use touch-screen and 18 use opti-scan. Within this group, there is no significant relationship between county size and voting technology.

A significant, unexplained relationship remained between voting technology and party shift. In the graph, opti-scan counties are represented by blue markers and touch-screen counties by red markers. County size is plotted horizontally, and party shift is the vertical axis. Upward displacement represents unexpected votes for Bush, and downward displacement is unexpected votes for Kerry. It is easy to see that the opti-scan counties shifted toward Bush, while touch-screen counties show a smaller shift toward Kerry.



On this map, just the 26 mid-size counties are shown in color. Red means opti-scan and blue means touch-screen. The opti-scan counties tended to be more in the north of the state. Still, the effect can be observed in mixed areas like the Southeast. On the right of the map, near the bottom, Red St Lucie County is sandwiched between Martin and Indian River Counties, both Blue. St Lucie County shifted to Bush, while Martin and Indian River shifted to Kerry.

### **Technical description of the analysis**

The registration percentage was defined as  $R/(R+D)$ , such that independent and third-party registrants were not part of the measure. Similarly, voting percentage was defined as  $Bush/(Bush+Kerry)$ . Party shift was defined as the difference between Republican voting percentage and Republican registration percentage.

In touch-screen counties, mean party shift was -2.9% in the D direction, with a standard deviation of 3.5% ( $z=2.3$ ,  $n=8$ ). In opti-scan counties, mean party shift was +6.0% in the R direction, with a standard deviation of 4.9% ( $z=5.2$ ,  $n=18$ ).

Analysis of Variance was performed on party shift as a dependent variable, with county size and voting machine type as the two independent variables. There was no significant relationship between county size and party shift ( $p=0.6$ ), but the relationship between voting technology and party shift was highly significant ( $p=0.00026$ ).

Corresponding analysis for results of the 2000 election showed a similar pattern, though less pronounced.

Touch-screen: mean party shift was -6.1% stdev=3.8%, ( $z=4.5$ ,  $n=18$ )

Opti-scan: mean party shift was +4.0% stdev=7.4%, ( $z=2.3$ ,  $n=18$ )

ANOVA: significant relationship between '04 voting technology and '00 party shift ( $p=0.0023$ ) but not county size and party shift ( $p=0.4$ ).

Note that the same counties were analyzed with the same division, based on '04 voting

technology, even though that technology was not in place in most of these counties in 2000.



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