The vast majority of the missiles representing the firepower of the US Navy for land attack firepower (Tomahawk Block IV -V), air defense (SM2-3-6-ESSM) and surface warfare (ESSM) are launched from vertical launchers (VLS-Vertical Launching System) of the combatant ships.
US VLS Capacity
Today, the US Navy has 96 VLS cells on each of its 70, DDG51-class destroyers; 80 VLS cells on each of its 3, Zumwalt-class cruisers; 122 VLS cells on each of its 17, CG47-class cruisers; and 12-40 VLS cells on each of its 12 Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines. If we assume and accept that all the ships in question, namely 102 destroyers, cruisers and submarines, are active and all VLS cells are full, we will have a total missile capacity of 10,000 (an average of 98 per ship) ready to fire.
VLS Capacity of US Allies
On the other hand, while the total VLS cell capacity of the United Kingdom, an inseparable ally of the US, is 732 missiles (38 per ship) on 19 ships, Japan has 1000 missiles (62 per ship) on 16 ships, and South Korea has 700 missiles (41 per ship) on 17 ships.
China and Russia VLS Capacity
If we examine the Chinese Navy, the biggest rival of the US Navy, there are 112 VLS cells on each of the 10, 055-class destroyers; 64 VLS cells on each of the 30, 052D-class destroyers; We see that there are 32 VLS cells in each of the 40, 054A class destroyers; 64 VLS cells in each of the 3, 075 class Amphibious Assault ships; 48 VLS cells in each of the 2, 901 class aircraft carriers, and a total of around 5000 missile capacity in 85 ships (an average of 58 per ship). These missile cells can fire HQ-10, HQ-16 missiles for air defense purposes; YJ-12, YJ-83 anti-ship missiles in surface warfare and YJ18 missiles for land attack missions. There is no VLS system in Chinese submarines. China’s ally Russia’s capacity is 828 missiles (26 per ship) in 32 ships/submarines.
Changing Missile Loads
As can be seen, there is no other navy other than the US and Russian navies that have vertical launcher systems in their submarines. In vertical launcher missile capability, missile loads change depending on the ship’s mission. Since the primary mission of warships is to ensure their own survival first, most vertical launcher loads, except for submarines, are given to air defense missiles. Missiles used against ships and land targets are prioritized according to the ship’s operational area and mission types. Let’s remember that in some warships, anti-ship missiles are fired from separate systems other than VLS. For example, American Harpoon missiles are fired from quadruple canisters.
The USA Is By Far Ahead in VLS Capacity
In short, although American warships are fewer than Chinese warships in terms of the number of platforms (450 against 297), they are twice as large in terms of VLS missile capacity, with 5000 missiles against 10,000 respectively. If Japan’s 1000 and South Korea’s 700 missile capacity are added to this number, it is seen that the situation is clearly disadvantageous for China.
VLS Alone Is Not a Criteria
Considering that the US’s biggest naval rival is the Chinese Navy and if we make an assessment for the Taiwan Island scenario in parallel with current conditions in the Pacific theater of operations, we need to look at three areas. The first is the number of VLS-capable ships that the US Navy can operate in the western Pacific theater of operations in parallel with overall combat readiness. The second is the procurement processes of these weapons and the third is the overall logistics for the support of US Navy in the Pacific theater of operations.
The US and the Number of Combat-ready VLS Ships
According to the statistics of the US’s own naval think tank, the USNI, as of November 4, 2024, the combat power of the US Navy was a total of 295 ships. (235 combat ships and 60 auxiliary ships.) 98 of these ships (69 combat ships and 29 auxiliary ships) were in the deployed status, away from their home bases. Only 75 of these ships were underway. USNI does not specify how many of the 75 ships are the combatant ships of the navy and how many are auxiliary ships. If we assume that 20 are auxiliary ships as of November 4, the number of combat ships on the move in all the seas of the United States is 55 ships. If we consider that a total of 102 combat ships have VLS systems and that this constitutes 43% of the total 235 combat ships, then a rough calculation shows that 20-25 of the 55 ships on the move in all the oceans and seas on November 4, 2024 have VLS capability.
Low Combat Readiness Level of the US Navy
The fact that 98 ships out of a total of 295 ships of the US are deployed is actually an indication that the combat readiness of the fleets is low. According to these statistics, the combat readiness level of the US Navy is around 40%. In addition to the fact that it will take years to bring the remaining ships up to combat ready status, it also should be noted that the average number of warships held in the US reserve fleet that will be used in mobilization is over 40 years old and they are in poor condition.
If we accept that some of the ships in their main bases will be made ready for combat in a short time in wartime, we can accept this level of %40 to be up around 50% with the highest optimism. The US Naval Forces Command aims to increase this very low value to 80% by 2027 under the Project 33. However the planned maintenance and repair activities of the US Navy today are 7 years behind the schedule. This is a very serious weakness.
2027 Scenario and Missile Loads
Under these conditions, if the US achieves 80% readiness in 2027, on which it bases its possible conflict scenario with China at best and deploys all of its combat-ready combat ships, which will be 188 in total, in the Western Pacific, the total number of ships with VLS capability will be around 80. With this number, the total VLS missile bay capacity can be evaluated as 8000.
For China, which has a total of 420 combat ships, the number of VLS-capable ships was 85 ships if all ships were ready for combat. Since China’s level of combat readiness is higher than the US Navy in terms of both the number of shipyards and the number of qualified personnel, if a 90% war readiness level is accepted, we come up with 76 VLS-capable ships.
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An American guided missile cruiser fires a tomahawk missile during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq [Credit: US Navy]
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In other words, we can talk about a rough parity in VLS capabilities between the US and China in the Western Pacific in 2027. However, let us remind you that the US’s ability to launch Tomahawk missiles from its submarines creates a great advantage. The US has 300 VLS capabilities in its 22 Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). If we consider that 16 of these ships will be deployed to the region at 80% readiness, the fact that at least a total of 240 missiles will be fired from underwater offers a great advantage to the US. Meanwhile, due to the intense need for air defense in the VLS missile loads of American surface ships, we can assume that 75% of the load will be air defense and the rest will be anti-ship and land attack missiles. On the other hand, considering that American warships within the first and second island chains and even the US base Guam are vulnerable to the Chinese missiles fired from both land, air and ships, it should be noted that the chance of survival or not being damaged of American combatant surface ships is low especially during the first hours of the war. American warships that enter the range of China’s anti-ship missiles fired from both sea and land or from the air will spend their air defense missiles for survival within hours.
The Serious Problem of the USA Is Missile Procurement
Although the US Navy is the one with the highest VLS missile firing capacity in the world, after these missiles are fired, they need to be replaced with new ones.
In the article titled “It’s Past Time to Re-Supply Our Munitions-Depleted U.S. Navy” in the June 14, 2024 issue of the American “The National Interest” Magazine, the author Jim Feine has written that the US Navy has procured 12,000 SM-2; 400 SM-3 and 1500 SM-6 air defense missiles and 9000 Tomahawk missiles (TLAM) until 2023; similarly, at least 2800 Standard and 2900 Tomahawk missiles were consumed in the wars, exercises and trainings after the Cold War in the same period. In this case, the author states that on paper, the US has a maximum of 11,000 missiles in SM-Standard air defense missiles ready to be launched with VLS and 6,000 missiles in Tomahawks and reveals that this inventory of 17,000 in total will not be enough for the second loading of 102 VLS ships/submarines with a total capacity of 10,000.
The article rightly attributes this weakness to the US’s focus on the Global War on Terror (GWOT) after 2001 and wars against relatively very weak opponents that US Navy didn’t require intensive air defense (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria). This situation, naturally, has significantly reduced the need for VLS missiles, except for Tomahawks. According to the same article, the Pentagon has purchased 125 SM-6s every year since 2017. It has also procured 122, 70 and 68 new Tomahawks in 2021, 2022 and 2023, respectively. Interestingly, the US President did not approve the new Tomahawk order for the 2025 budget.
Missiles Running Out Due to Israel
On the other hand, the main reason why the number of air defense missiles in the US is rapidly decreasing today is that the US VLS-capable warships are launching dozens of missiles to prevent missile attacks from Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah in the Middle East armed conflicts. In the article titled ‘Destroying Houthi and Iranian missiles cost the US $1 billion’ by Peter Suciu in the American ‘’The National Interest’’ Magazine dated April 17, 2024, the statements made by the US Navy Secretary Del Toro for the US Congress were mentioned. The secretary said the following: “We have countered more than 130 direct attacks on U.S. Navy ships and merchant ships, over the past six months. The Navy has fired nearly $1 billion worth of air defense missiles to counter air threats from Iran and its proxies.” Del Toro underlined the financial pressure this situation is putting on naval stockpiles, stressing the urgent need for $2 billion in short-term funding to replenish ammunition and $95 billion in additional funding later.
The US Is Draining Its Essential Stockpiles
No U.S. warships equipped with VLS systems have yet been hit by a Houthi or Iranian missile, but the war of attrition in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea is eating away at resources set aside for the upcoming major conflict with China. For example, the SM-3, which is suitable for intercepting long-range ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere, costs between $9.7 million and $27.9 million, depending on the range. It was announced that the Navy fired ‘four to seven’ of them during the defense of Israel on April 14, 2024.
According to the Wall Street Journal dated October 29, 2024, American warships have spent a total of nearly 100 air defense missiles worth $1.8 billion in both the Mediterranean and the Red Seas in the last year when added the VLS firings of the 4 Aegis cruisers in the Mediterranean to support Israel in the missile and drone attack defense against Iran on October1. As required by the air defense doctrine, American warships fire 2 missiles at an approaching target to ensure destruction which increases the cost. An American congressional official said:
“These are expensive munitions to hit the Houthi targets… It takes months to replace each one and it is very costly.”
On the other hand, the US defense industry does not only use these missiles in the Prosperity Guardian Operation carried out against the Houthis in the Red Sea to protect merchant ships.
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Operation Prosperity Guardian (Source)
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In the event of war, these VLS ships will protect aircraft carrier strike groups. Considering that the US has 11 strike groups of 11 aircraft carriers, in the event of a war, at least 44-55 VLS capable ships will have to be allocated solely to this task. On the other hand the US Navy is extremely wary of China’s 5000-8000 km range DF 27 hypersonic anti-ship missiles which is very effective anti-access and area denial weapon. Therefore, they are looking for other solutions, considering that their current air defense capacity will not be sufficient.
The Reuters, Mike Stone article dated October 25, 2024 states the following :
“The US Navy, fearful of China deploying hypersonic weapons to sink ships in the Pacific, will equip some of its ships with Patriot interceptor missiles.”
In the details of this news, we understand that the integration of PAC 3 missiles into Aegis-class air defense ships will be initiated. The news emphasizes that PAC 3s were successful in shooting down hypersonic missiles in the Ukraine-Russia war.
MIC (Military Industrial Complex) Is Not Ready
The main problem is that the US Navy and defense industry do not have the production infrastructure designed for a large-scale war of attrition in both Europe and the Middle East. Considering that the real war will take place in the Pacific, both the Ukrainian and Israeli fronts cause vulnerabilities in American defense industry plans. The US is spending the missiles it will use in the war with China, in the Mediterranean and the Red Seas. On the other hand, short-range SM-2s cost a little over $2 million each, and SM-6s cost approximately $3.9 million. However, most importantly, the production of one SM 3 missile takes 2 years at the fastest and 3 years at the longest. Considering that its standard missiles are used by 13 countries, including Turkiye, we can also predict that the RTX company, which produces these missiles, will be under great pressure in the coming days. In short, the US faces a serious air threat from its rivals. The old days are over. The attack capabilities of Iran, Russia and especially China are at a level that will limit the air defense capabilities of the US Navy.
American Maritime Logistics in the Pacific
The most important fact that the US observed in the Russia-Ukraine crisis is the difficulties it faces in establishing a sea bridge between Europe and the US in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea since the American merchant fleet is insufficient. They have only 200 ships flying their own flag. The US auxiliary ship fleet MSC (Military Sealift Command) also has very limited resources. It is not enough for its own needs. They have 19 fleet support ships, 14 ammunition transport vessels; 15 military supply transport ships; 21 pre-positioned stockpiling ships in overseas bases. For China, this number is 5,500. The Pentagon will conduct approximately 90% of its logistics activities by sea in the event of a conflict with China. These numbers will be extremely insufficient in a two-front war with China and Russia on the Atlantic/European and Asia/Pacific fronts. The war time load of a mechanized division alone weigh over 100 thousand tons.
According to NATO’s cold war plans, in a war in Europe, the first months of the war the amount of cargo that needed to be reinforced from the US was around 25 million tons. The military operation requirement was 100 million barrels of petroleum products then. Now, let’s add the Pacific theater of operations to this picture, where the distances are 2-3 times longer than the European front and can be measured in values of 2000-5000 miles. There is a difficult picture. In February 2024, a committee of the House of Representatives described the maritime logistics capacity of the Pentagon’s Transportation Command (Transcom) as “insufficient.” The most important US allies in the Pacific, such as Japan, Australia and South Korea, do not have oil. At least for fuel, they are dependent on US protection. Let’s add to this the requirements of Ukraine and Israel which will need American protection in the Middle East. I’m not even counting the sea lift that will last for months in the Pacific and therefore the need to protect these logistical support convoys against three-dimensional threats. Except for 11 nuclear aircraft carriers, every ship needs to refuel at sea several times during ocean crossings. However, US Navy does not have enough ships. Even if they do, the number of VLS ships to defend these ships is not enough because priorities are different. On the other hand the meeting the navy’s missile needs is at least as important as meeting the fuel needs.
Surface ships will exhaust their standard missile loads in the first days of the war, and the available ones do not allow for a second full load anyway. If an Iran-Israel war breaks out and the US is drawn into war with Iran, we can say that the stocks will decrease much faster and will not be enough for a single load, let alone a second load, by 2027. On the other hand, the transfer of these missiles manufactured in the homeland to the navy and loading them onto ships in Pacific theater of Operations under the Chinese missile threat is a separate problem area.
Furthermore, if Chinese submarines apply the aggressive submarine warfare like American submarines practiced in World War II, the supply ships carrying these missiles could be sunk en route. The fact that the closest American base to the region, such as Guam, is under threat from Chinese Air and Missiles is a separate problem.
In short, although the US’s VLS capabilities are twice that of China, it is not easy to say that this situation will make a serious difference in the US-China war that will be fought far from the homeland. The problems that the US needs to solve are much, much more than the two-fold advantage. The top priority of the Trump era will be to overcome the problems of the US Navy.
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Ret Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Writer, Geopolitical Expert, Theorist and creator of the Turkish Bluehomeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine. He served as the Chief of Strategy Department and then the head of Plans and Policy Division in Turkish Naval Forces Headquarters. As his combat duties, he has served as the commander of Amphibious Ships Group and Mine Fleet between 2007 and 2009. He retired in 2012. He established Hamit Naci Blue Homeland Foundation in 2021. He has published numerous books on geopolitics, maritime strategy, maritime history and maritime culture. He is also a honorary member of ATASAM.
He is a regular contributor to Global Research.
