Imad Khadurri comments incisively on a recently released CIA “Intelligent” Intelligence Report on the Nature of the Insurgency in Iraq.

As Imad points out, with a touch of humor, these intelligent statements are still classified, but here are some “glimpses” and press reviews of this Top Secret Report, which have cost the US tax payer a few millions….

 As reflected in CIA classified studies last month, U.S. military and intelligence officials are still trying to understand (my italics) the various Iraqi insurgency groups that they expect will continue to fight, even after last week’s election.

The CIA studies included a detailed look at an at-large Iraqi fighter (my italics) who is motivated to fight because the United States is occupying his country, a senior intelligence official said.

“This person, with a tribal background, has a mix of motives including a family grievance, someone was hurt by coalition forces,” said the official, who asked not to be identified because the reports are still classified. “There is also [in this Iraqi insurgent] religion and nationalism that results in a view he must fight on to get non-Muslims out of Muslim territory.”

The CIA last month also updated its analysis of the breadth of the Iraqi insurgency, including Iraqis that are not only former Baathists, “dead enders,” but also newly radicalized Sunni Iraqis, nationalists offended by the occupying force and others disenchanted by the economic turmoil and destruction caused by the fighting.

Foreign fighters associated with Abu Musab Zarqawi and his al Qaeda-affiliated insurgent group, who once were seen as the prime opponents along with tens of thousands of criminals freed by Saddam Hussein before the war began in 2003, are now described as lesser elements (my italics) but still a source of danger.

 (CIA Studies Provide Glimpse of Insurgents in Iraq   WP February 6, 2005)

So, how many billions of dollars did this intelligent “Intelligence” cost?

And how much effort was required on the part of many experts on “anti-terrorism”, such as Bremer, to reach this conclusion after twenty two months of occupation?

They certainly did not get this kind of inside information from Allawi, Chalabi, Khidir Hamza, Makkiya and Ajami, now did they?

And how is Rumsfeld going to deal with these now-called fighters in his typical forward planning, sharp analysis, political sophistication and lofty moral attitudes? …… “Well, you know, that’s Life.”:

“What you need to do is have the economic progress, the political progress which is going forward in such good style (sic). And that will determine the level of the insurgency,” Rumsfeld said.

“And the level of the insurgency will determine the speed at which Iraqi security forces will be capable of managing that level of insurgency.”
He acknowledged there were are lot of “ifs,” but added, “That’s life.”

… “We don’t have intelligence that good. I just don’t know,” Rumsfeld said.” 

(Rumsfeld Says No Iraq Self-Security Date   APN News, February 6, 2005)

MR. RUSSERT: How many Iraqi security forces do we need fully trained and capable of fighting insurgents?

SEC’Y RUMSFELD: Well, the answer to that question is not complicated. We need as many as are needed. If you have an insurgency that’s this level, you’ll need X. If you have an insurgency that’s that level, you’ll need X-plus. And if you have an insurgency that’s quite low, you’ll need X-minus. And to think that you can sit here today and–I mean, no one predicted the level of the insurgency as it is today (my italics).

Meet the Press, NBC, Sunday February 6, 2005, transcript (Thanks to a comment by Evelyn)

Here is one humble soul who tried (without costing the CIA, or the Pentagon, a penny of US tax dollars:

But I guess with friends like the five mentioned above, who needs enemies, eh?

“Wanna know my answer to that?”

Liberation much appreciated

Source: Imad Khadduri