

Russia's Final Warning to NATO - You'll Get Your War, But It'll be Over in 15 Minutes.

We are inches away from a global thermonuclear war.

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Global Research, November 24, 2024

Region: [Russia and FSU](#), [USA](#)

Theme: [Intelligence](#), [Military](#), [Military and WMD](#), [US NATO War Agenda](#)

In-depth Report: [Nuclear War](#), [UKRAINE REPORT](#)

"So this is not about whether or not to allow the Ukrainian regime to strike Russia using these weapons, but about deciding whether or not NATO countries are directly involved in the military conflict or not...it will mean that NATO countries, the United States and European countries, are at war with Russia.

*And if this is so, bearing in mind the change in the very nature of the conflict, **we will make appropriate decisions based on the threats that will be posed to us.**" - President Vladimir Putin (September 12, 2024)*

We are inches away from [a global thermonuclear war](#). And no, this isn't a meaningless, overused catchphrase. Quite the contrary, it's as serious as it gets. We have reached a historical boiling point. At no other time in human history have we been closer to the scenario of annihilation, not even during the so-called "Cuban" Missile Crisis. It should really be called "Turkish" or something along those lines. And it's important to note that we're not digressing from the topic by mentioning this.

Namely, [the mainstream propaganda machine just loves maintaining its narratives](#) that essentially [whitewash the political West](#) and denigrate the actual world. This is why the fact that the United States initiated the "Cuban" Missile Crisis by deploying nuclear-tipped missiles in Italy and Turkey back in 1961 (although some sources claim it was as early as 1959) is ever so "conveniently" forgotten. The USSR waited a full year (at the very least) to respond by placing its own missiles in Cuba.

Thus, it's perfectly clear who initiated that confrontation. And yet, as previously mentioned, modern historiography remembers the event as the "Cuban" Missile Crisis, sending a subliminal message that it was initiated by the Soviet Union and Cuba. Why is this important? Because the same people are now telling us that Russia "escalated" the NATO-orchestrated Ukrainian conflict by "firing missiles at a democratic Ukraine", [once again "forgetting" to mention the preceding events.](#)

Namely, as we all know, [the political West gave the Neo-Nazi junta the go-ahead to use long-range missiles against targets deeper within Russia.](#) And they just did.

In the last two days, approximately a dozen ATACMS and “Storm Shadow”/SCALP-EG missiles have been used (on the same day Moscow [updated its nuclear doctrine](#), mind you).

So, how did the “evil Kremlin”, led by the “crazy, bloodthirsty tyrant Putin”, respond to this? Well, not with nukes, as we’re still here, even though the doctrine allows it.

However, Russia did fire what is technically an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile). [This marks the first time such a weapon was used in a conflict.](#)

And while ICBMs normally carry thermonuclear warheads, this one was conventionally armed. To better understand what sort of weapon this is, we have to go back a decade or so, specifically to the RS-26 “Rubezh” program that was supposed to deter NATO’s crawling aggression in Europe and the post-Soviet space.



Namely, **the RS-26 was envisaged as the successor to [the formidable RSD-10 “Pioneer” IRBM \(intermediate-range ballistic missile\)](#)** (image left). Essentially a shortened version of the three-stage RS-24 “Yars” ICBM, with one stage removed (and some other modifications), the RS-26 had a shorter range, but was no less deadly. In fact, it carried more powerful warheads than the “Pioneer” (at least four 300 kt instead of the latter’s three 150 kt ones), while also being more accurate and impossible to intercept.

This enabled it to target even massive underground command centers or any other high-priority targets across NATO-occupied Europe. However, there was a (geo)political problem with the RS-26. Namely, [it was made at a time when the INF Treaty was still in force](#) (banning all missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km). So, for the RS-26 to formally comply with this, it had to have a range greater than 5,500 km. Otherwise, it would violate the INF Treaty and be designated as an IRBM.

To avoid this, it was designed to achieve a maximum range of 5,800 km, just enough to be designated as an ICBM. However, this created another problem, as it affected the New START treaty. Namely, this would force Russia to reduce the number of its, so to speak, “purebred” ICBMs such as “Yars”, R-36M2 “Voevoda” and [RS-28 “Sarmat”](#). As a result, in 2011, the program was postponed for a period after 2027, with most resources diverted to the development of [Russia’s new hypersonic weapons](#).

However, [on August 2, 2019, the US unilaterally withdrew from the INF Treaty](#) and started developing [previously banned intermediate and medium-range missiles](#), prompting Russia to respond. These programs accelerated significantly after the start of the special military operation (SMO), resulting in new designs, as well as [massive improvements to the existing](#)

[ones](#). However, we still didn't hear almost anything about the RS-26, indicating that the program might have even been scrapped altogether.

But, on [April 12 this year, Moscow tested an "unnamed ICBM"](#). To this day, the Russian military is yet to publicly reveal the exact type of the missile launched that day. At the time, [I argued that the missile was actually the RS-26](#), as it had striking similarities with the previously mentioned RS-24 that the "Rubezh" was actually based on, including the way it conducted wobbling maneuvers designed to confuse NATO's ABM (anti-ballistic missile) systems, making it virtually impossible to intercept.



For seven months, no news came through about this "mysterious ICBM". Until the early hours of November 21, that is. Initially, the Russian military didn't reveal what missile it was, letting NATO contemplate what to do next. However, the "mysterious ICBM" was soon not only uncovered, but actually named – **"Oreshnik" ("Hazel" in Russian)**. However, solid information about the missile is extremely scant, fueling all sorts of [speculation, wild guessing and outright misinformation](#).

For instance, the Pentagon insists the missile that hit Dnepropetrovsk was fired from Kapustin Yar, a testing site in the Astrakhan oblast (region) in southern Russia, located over 1000 km to the east. This distance is too short for an ICBM, raising questions about the veracity of the US military's claims. Then, videos from Kazakhstan emerged, [specifically over the city of Satbayev](#), which is 1,500 km to the east of Kapustin Yar. Even more interestingly, some 450 km to the southeast lies Sary Shagan.

This place is home to one of the largest and most important missile test sites in the former Soviet Union, with the Russian military still using it extensively, including during the aforementioned April 12 test. It's simply impossible to see "Oreshnik" fly over Satbayev if it was fired from Kapustin Yar to Dnepropetrovsk. However, it's certainly possible that the missile was fired from Sary Shagan. Still, NATO doesn't want to reveal that it flew nearly 2,400 km before [hitting its targets with pinpoint precision](#).

Even more interestingly, [videos over Satbayev also show that the missile is wobbling and maneuvering](#) just like the "mysterious ICBM" tested on April 12, **further reinforcing the notion that the "Oreshnik" could actually be a conventionally armed "Rubezh"**. **In addition, its maximum range exceeds 5,000 km, which puts virtually all of Europe in range.** And indeed, it makes little sense to get a completely new missile if you have the "Rubezh", as it's already a largely finished product.

Technically speaking, there are several possibilities when it comes to the "Oreshnik". First, it doesn't even have to be a regular missile and could be some sort of MaRV (maneuverable reentry vehicle), MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle), HGV (hypersonic glide vehicle), etc. or perhaps even a hybrid, with the "Rubezh" being the primary missile

carrier. The “Rubezh” itself can already carry the [“Avangard”](#), so if the “Oreshnik” is an [HGV](#), it shouldn’t be a problem for the “Rubezh” to deploy it.

Another possibility is [that the “Oreshnik” is a completely new missile](#) (not necessarily ballistic, but likely a more advanced hypersonic, maneuvering weapon) that has its own MIRV/MaRV/HGV warheads. There are no definite claims about this at present, simply because very little is publicly known about it. However, personally, I am more inclined to believe that the “Oreshnik” is a conventionally armed HGV that can be carried by nuclear-capable ICBM/IRBMs like the RS-26 “Rubezh”.

The reason is quite simple, because why would someone make something completely new when they already have a finished project that can immediately go into production (the “Rubezh” uses the same production lines as the “Yars”)? This reinforces the notion that the **RS-26 is a highly modular design which can be equipped with various types of warheads, including conventional ones. It also harkens back to [President Putin’s vision of Russia’s strategic preemptive strike capabilities](#).**

Video

One more thing that should be noted about the “Oreshnik” is that it was certainly an overkill against the Neo-Nazi junta.

Russia’s more [tactical and operational level missiles could’ve easily conducted this](#). **However, given the fact that Moscow is faced with [the increasingly delusional and aggressive West](#), it just had to demonstrate its firepower, prompting Putin to authorize the long-range strike on Dnepropetrovsk. This is a particularly important message to both the US and EU/NATO.**

In terms of the functioning of the missile’s warhead, the available footage shows at least 30 smaller projectiles divided into five groups (six in each). The lack of visible detonations (although [at least one was seen](#)) suggests these are probably advanced kinetic penetrators capable of annihilating heavily defended and dug-in positions.

[This means that any NATO base anywhere in Europe and/or elsewhere would be in range, but Russia wouldn’t need to rely on its thermonuclear arsenal to deter aggression.](#)

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This article was originally published on [InfoBrics](#).

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