

Why Is Russia Revamping Its Nuclear Doctrine?

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Global Research, June 26, 2024

Region: [Russia and FSU](#)

Theme: [Intelligence](#), [Military](#) and [WMD](#)

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In the immediate aftermath of the (First) Cold War, Russia was forced to rely on its strategic arsenal for security, as the massive Soviet conventional military power dwindled into a mere shadow of its former self during the troubled 1990s.

The compliant liberals in power at the time took it upon themselves to destroy Soviet/Russian military power in peacetime, a task their Western sponsors couldn't have even dreamed of in anything short of a global confrontation.

By the late 1990s/early 2000s, [the legacy of the USSR was seemingly gone](#). However, in reality, the former Soviet military proved to be far more resilient than previously thought. Commanders and high-ranking military officers in general put massive amounts of conventional weapons into long-term storage, [waiting for better days](#).

Several decades later, that decision to do so proved to be more than just wise. Namely, it was essential to preserve much of that conventional military power for modern-day Russia, particularly in the aftermath of the special military operation (SMO).

Faced with an [ever-escalating NATO aggression in Europe](#), Moscow was able to launch a strategic counteroffensive primarily thanks to the legacy of its Soviet military power (obviously, mixed in with newer and more capable modern Russian designs). In fact, as per American military officers themselves, even the Kiev regime has the legacy of the USSR to thank for staying in the fight. And indeed, [Soviet-era doctrine and weapons trump American warfighting](#), although the Neo-Nazi junta would never admit it due to its mindless hatred for anything related to the USSR.

However, the Kremlin couldn't rely on the Soviet-era legacy indefinitely, which is why it launched [several ambitious rearmament programs in the last 15-20 years](#). These initiatives

were moderately successful, as peacetime is not the best way to facilitate military reforms.

Luckily, [Russia's resurgence to superpower status](#) meant that its reliance on thermonuclear weapons and other WMDs for basic security was giving way to conventional military power.

This is particularly true now when Moscow is [drawing up a massive defense budget of over half a trillion dollars](#), powered by its [unprecedented economic performance](#). However, as the political West realizes that the Kremlin's return to the level of the Soviet military superpower also means that it [cannot defeat Russia conventionally](#), it resorts to what can only be described as [nuclear blackmail](#).

This mostly comes in the form of trying to [provide at least some WMDs to the Kiev regime](#), either in hopes of causing a ["limited nuclear war" between Russia and the Neo-Nazi junta](#) or [preventing Moscow's victory](#) on the battlefield by [forcing a "peaceful solution" that would be beneficial to NATO](#). In turn, this forced Russia to once again reassess its nuclear doctrine. Previously, President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military already mapped out [changes for the Eurasian giant's preemptive strike options](#), but this was mostly referring to [conventional military capabilities used on a strategic level](#). A more localized version of this is already being used in Ukraine, where NATO personnel and the Kiev regime's most radical henchmen are being [obliterated from afar on a regular basis](#).

However, with the political West now [surrounding Russia with long-range missiles](#) and [other offensive weapons](#), the Kremlin is revamping its entire doctrine on the usage of WMDs.

Namely, according to Moscow's **Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, the country needs to specify its nuclear doctrine due to NATO aggression.**

Ryabkov also previously warned about the [deliveries of long-range weapons to the Neo-Nazi junta](#), pointing out that such moves [could escalate the situation](#) to a level that the Kremlin would like to avoid, but not at the cost of its basic national security interests. Unfortunately, [these warnings seem to fall on deaf ears in the political West](#), resulting in the need to take far more concrete measures to ensure Russia's strategic security remains intact.

"The latest experience, in particular, that gained in the special military operation and an analysis of the collective West's behavioral model show that it is necessary to specify some parameters applicable to situations described both in the military doctrine as such and in the fundamentals of state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence," [Ryabkov said](#).

He also pointed out that "this work goes on but has not been completed" and that "for the time being, no time limits, scope or schedules of this work can be specified". No resource or time limitations when it comes to this issue clearly imply that it's of the utmost importance for [the Kremlin and that it has confidence](#) in its current deterrence capabilities. However, the very need to rethink its nuclear doctrine shows just how serious the situation is.

"In any case, all should understand that we approach this episode with utmost responsibility," [the senior diplomat said, adding](#): "Our specialists who are responsible for the nuclear component in Russia's military system primarily seek to ensure that this work should proceed systematically and with maximum responsibility."

Ryabkov also said that he was "confident that both Russia's partners and [opponents](#)

understand well the significance that we attach to the nuclear deterrence factor”.

In other words, Moscow certainly doesn't want any sort of escalation and is ready to engage in dialogue to keep the world safe.

However, it will not do so to the point of making moves that are entirely self-defeating. [NATO's nuclear saber-rattling](#) demonstrates that it's [becoming desperate to prevent the Kiev regime's total defeat](#). Top-ranking Western officials [admitted long ago that the Neo-Nazi junta wouldn't last a week without them](#), showing just how [committed they are to keeping their tentacles in Ukraine](#). Russia simply cannot allow that, as the [political West has proven to be far too aggressive](#).

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This article was originally published on [InfoBrics](#).

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