

# Merkel Government Failed to Prevent ISIS Terror Operations in Germany, Intelligence Bodies Received Warnings and Failed to Act

By [William Craddick](#)

Global Research, January 17, 2017

[Disobedient Media](#) 12 January 2017

Region: [Europe](#), [Middle East & North Africa](#)

Theme: [Intelligence](#)

*A troubling series of revelations about German failures to prevent Islamic State operations within the country raise questions about their ability and willingness to effectively combat terror. The string of intelligence fiascos in 2016 comes as documents from Wikileaks show that Germany's Federal Office for Migration and Refugees had a policy of admitting migrants who were a known terror risk with the intention of recruiting them as informants over a decade and a half ago.*

## **I. Germany failed to heed multiple warnings about Berlin truck attacker Anis Amri**

In the aftermath of the recent December 2016 Berlin truck attack, reports have emerged that German intelligence received prior warnings about the likelihood that an incident was due to occur but failed to take action. On December 22nd, 2016, [Moroccan World News](#) revealed that Morocco had warned German intelligence officials in September 2016 that Berlin truck attacker Anis Amri had jihadist tendencies and was known to have sworn allegiance to the Islamic State. On October 11th, they gave German intelligence a second tip that Amri had been residing in Germany illegally for 14 months and that he was regularly meeting with two known members of ISIS who were described as “dangerous.” German officials do not appear to have acted on either tip from their Moroccan counterparts.

The article further explained that Spanish and French authorities have successfully dismantled terror cells based on information passed to them by Moroccan intelligence in the past. Why Germany failed to heed a tip from an intelligence source which had a proven track record of assisting anti-terror operations in other European states is unknown.

## **II. ISIS was able to successfully infiltrate German intelligence organizations in 2016**

This series of failures to properly investigate Anis Amri and prevent the Berlin truck attack came on the heels of November 2016 reports that an intelligence officer working for Germany's internal intelligence agency, the Bundesverfassungsschutz (BfV) was arrested for taking part in a plot to bomb the BfV's headquarters in Cologne, Germany. This news was given little to no attention by U.S. media. See [The Telegraph](#) and [The Sun](#)

German news source [Der Spiegel](#) reported that the 51 year-old intelligence officer made a “partial confession” to his role in plotting the attack following his arrest.

These failures to properly respond to warnings about the Berlin truck attack and the infiltration of intelligence organizations by ISIS operatives seem to indicate either a troubling level of incompetence or complicity within German intelligence and anti-terror bureaus.

### **III. Wikileaks' BND Inquiry Exhibit reveals German willingness to admit at risk migrants to use as informants**

In Wikileaks' recent BND-NSA Inquiry Exhibit, there is a cache of files from the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) or Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. The document reveals criteria for tips that the BAMF was giving in the early 2000's to German intelligence agencies looking to recruit informants from among refugee populations:

<https://wikileaks.org/bnd-inquiry/docs/BAMF/MAT%20A%20BAMF-1a.pdf>

The significant portions of this document are as follows:

On page 14:

We're looking for accomplices or candidates involved in terrorist activities that have not yet become perpetrators

They were specifically looking for Taliban defectors from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan as well as civilians born in Afghanistan and Egypt as well as a few other Middle Eastern countries.

On pages 15-16 they list tiers of individuals they are looking to recruit from:

Tier 1: Males with the following personal features: Aged 18-45, single, lower-middle-class to poor background, lived in refugee camps for a while, poor occupational and societal prospects, sketchy CV, Muslim belief, doesn't support UMMA (collective community of Islamic peoples).

Tier 2: Individuals with knowledge about suspected terrorist organizations

Tier 3: Individuals that resided in or have knowledge about Al-Azher University, Cairo, or the El-Haramain Institute of Culture which is founded by Saudi Arabia and used to promote Wahabbism, the Islamic sect that most jihadist groups draw upon for their ideology.

This is highly alarming, because it proves that German intelligence has in the past been aware of the fact that there are individuals among the refugee population that have knowledge of terror organizations, are "defectors" from them or have been exposed to radical Islamic ideologies at certain educational institutions.

Why have they not simply been arresting these people and preventing them from 1) committing attacks and 2) radicalizing even more males from the refugee population? Does the BAMF continue to have a similar policy towards migrants today? A basic assumption is that German intelligence would not admit any migrants they felt they could not maintain control over. Given their string of failures to tackle extremists that confidence can no longer be extended to them.

The apparent willingness of German officials to admit at risk migrants is certainly very strange. Unless of course, one views it from the perspective that they might want “incidents” to occur as a result of neglecting to crack down on known and potential extremists.

The original source of this article is [Disobedient Media](#)  
Copyright © [William Craddick](#), [Disobedient Media](#), 2017

---

[Comment on Global Research Articles on our Facebook page](#)

[Become a Member of Global Research](#)

Articles by: [William Craddick](#)

**Disclaimer:** The contents of this article are of sole responsibility of the author(s). The Centre for Research on Globalization will not be responsible for any inaccurate or incorrect statement in this article. The Centre of Research on Globalization grants permission to cross-post Global Research articles on community internet sites as long the source and copyright are acknowledged together with a hyperlink to the original Global Research article. For publication of Global Research articles in print or other forms including commercial internet sites, contact: [publications@globalresearch.ca](mailto:publications@globalresearch.ca)  
[www.globalresearch.ca](http://www.globalresearch.ca) contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available to our readers under the provisions of "fair use" in an effort to advance a better understanding of political, economic and social issues. The material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving it for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material for purposes other than "fair use" you must request permission from the copyright owner.

For media inquiries: [publications@globalresearch.ca](mailto:publications@globalresearch.ca)