

Kiev Still Wants a New Counteroffensive. “Push back the Evil Russians”

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For several months now, the Kiev regime has been talking about “new counteroffensives”. [Desperate to get more “military aid”](#) from the United States and European Union, the Neo-Nazi junta keeps [fantasizing about large-scale offensive operations](#) that would “push back the evil Russians”, but that’s as viable as Hitler’s “grand plans” of counteroffensives while the Red Army was already taking Berlin.

Still, the Kiev regime keeps dreaming, particularly now when it needs to justify the hundreds of billions it got from the political West. However, problems persist, as the Neo-Nazi junta forces simply have no real offensive capabilities. [The manpower is severely depleted](#), Soviet-era hardware largely gone, while the NATO-sourced one is simply [not robust enough to survive the brutal realities of warfare](#). Not to mention that it’s also far more expensive and much more difficult to acquire and/or replace.

On the other hand, how does one conduct a counteroffensive against an opponent that keeps advancing? The Russian military is grinding away, [destroying virtually every hostile grouping in its path](#). If ground forces are having trouble advancing because of dug-in and fortified areas, they call in artillery or close air support. If that doesn’t work, Russian fighter-bombers and tactical strike aircraft move in, dropping the new UMPK-equipped precision-guided bombs, obliterating any and all fortifications. Worse yet for the Kiev regime, [its endemically corrupt politicians](#) stole the money that was supposed to turn the northern areas of the Kharkov oblast (region) into a virtual fortress. Expectedly, none of that happened, while Moscow’s artillery dominance keeps growing, to say nothing of various types of new and ever more advanced drones and [long-range strike capabilities](#).

Even top NATO commanders are unconvinced that their Neo-Nazi junta puppets are capable of new counteroffensives any time soon. Back in February, British Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, [infamous for his direct involvement in attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet](#), said that he didn't expect any new offensive operations by the Kiev regime forces before early 2025. [According to his assessment](#), "the Ukrainian military increasingly struggles with Russian forces". And indeed, there's simply [no viable way for the Neo-Nazi junta to even consolidate its own lines of defense](#), let alone mount a counteroffensive against the much better organized and equipped Russian forces. Not to mention the far better strategic support these troops have, including much more frequent troops rotation, which affects both the morale and fighting capabilities of the personnel.

However, the long-term situation looks even worse for the Kiev regime, as the Russian military is yet to reach its maximum fighting capacity. Namely, [the recent changes in the Kremlin's Ministry of Defense](#) indicate a move to the maximum efficiency of resource distribution, while [the massive increase in defense spending](#) suggests a militarization of parts of the [rapidly growing Russian economy](#). The cumulative effect of these changes certainly doesn't bode well for NATO's favorite Neo-Nazi puppets. Namely, although Moscow already boasts [superior production capacity in artillery](#) (a crucial aspect of [resurgent industrial warfare](#)), these changes will increase the aforementioned advantages exponentially. It's only a matter of time before this process starts changing the balance of power in the frontlines, further exacerbating the situation for Kiev.

It might even be argued that these changes are already visible and the Kremlin is already applying them to increase its strategic advantage. At this time, Russian forces are divided into six operational groupings. The focus of operations is still in the Donetsk oblast, where the "Center" group is advancing in operational unison with the "East" and "South" groups, while the "West" is aiding all three by advancing in both the northern sector of the Donetsk oblast and eastern areas of the Kharkov oblast, specifically in the direction of Krasny Liman and Kupyansk, respectively. Meanwhile, the "Dnieper" group is conducting defensive operations in the Kherson oblast, as well as a combination of defensive and limited offensive operations in the Zaporozhye oblast. The "Dnieper" group is best known for bearing the brunt and ultimately defeating [the Neo-Nazi junta's much-touted counteroffensive last year](#).

The most recent addition to these five Russian groups is the "North", which has been conducting offensive operations in the Kharkov oblast. Its composition suggests that it's mostly geared towards artillery warfare, [implying that its main purpose is to overstretch the Kiev regime forces](#) and relieve pressure off the combined grouping of forces in the Donetsk oblast. Facing all of them are five operational groups of the Neo-Nazi junta, namely "Tavria", "Khortytsia", "Odessa" and its own "North". The fifth group, named "Marun" is kept as a strategic reserve in case any of the previous four need backup. "Tavria's" areas of responsibility are Zaporozhye and Donetsk, "Khortytsia's" are northern Donetsk and eastern Kharkov, "Odessa's" is Kherson, while the "North" is responsible for the northern Kharkov oblast (named the same as the Russian operational group in the same area).

These forces enjoyed significant numerical superiority for over two years, but due to heavy casualties, the ratio of forces is now much closer to 1:1, although the Kiev regime still maintains a slight advantage in numbers. However, [the casualty ratio tells a different story](#). Standing at approximately 10:1, it explains the massive reduction in the Neo-Nazi junta's numerical advantage. This indicates that any offensive potential of these forces is being chipped away, meaning that it will only get worse in the long run. Thus, the Kiev regime's best time for a counteroffensive is now. On the other hand, the Russian military's advantage

is bound to grow, meaning that all it needs to do is continue with incremental advances. The chances of this dynamic changing anytime soon are slim to none. Thus, we're far more likely to see a major Russian offensive than the Neo-Nazi junta's yet another counteroffensive.

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