

Official “Secret” Israeli Document Revealed: Expel All Palestinians from Gaza, Israeli Intelligence Ministry

An Intelligence Ministry document revealed by Local Call and +972 shows how the idea of population transfer to the Sinai is reaching official discussions.

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The Israeli Ministry of Intelligence is recommending the forcible and permanent transfer of the Gaza Strip’s 2.2 million Palestinian residents to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, according to an official document [revealed in full](#) for the first time by +972’s partner site Local Call yesterday.

The 10-page document, dated Oct. 13, 2023, bears the logo of the Intelligence Ministry — a small governmental body that produces policy research and shares its proposals with intelligence agencies, the army, and other ministries. It assesses three options regarding the future of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in the framework of the [current war](#), and recommends a full population transfer as its preferred course of action. It also calls on Israel to enlist the international community in support of this endeavor. The document, whose authenticity was confirmed by the ministry, has been [translated into English](#) in full here on +972.

The existence of the document does not necessarily indicate that its recommendations are being considered by Israel’s defense establishment. Despite its name, the [Intelligence Ministry](#) is not directly responsible for any intelligence body, but rather independently prepares studies and policy papers that are distributed to the Israeli government and security agencies for review, but are not binding. The ministry’s annual budget is NIS 25 million and its influence is considered relatively small. It is currently headed by Gila Gamliel, a member of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud Party.

However, the fact that an Israeli government ministry has prepared such a detailed proposal amid a large-scale military offensive on the Gaza Strip, following Hamas' deadly assault and [massacres](#) in southern Israeli communities on Oct. 7, reflects how the idea of forced population transfer is being raised to the level of official policy discussions. Fears of such plans — which would constitute a serious war crime under international law — [have grown](#) in recent weeks, especially after the Israeli army [ordered](#) about 1 million Palestinians to [evacuate](#) the northern Gaza Strip ahead of escalating [bombardment](#) and incremental ground incursions.

The document recommends that Israel act to “evacuate the civilian population to Sinai” during the war; establish tent cities and later more permanent cities in the northern Sinai that will absorb the expelled population; and then create “a sterile zone of several kilometers ... within Egypt, and [prevent] the return of the population to activities/residences near the border with Israel.” At the same time, governments around the world, led by the United States, must be mobilized to implement the move.

A source in the Intelligence Ministry confirmed to Local Call/+972 that the document was authentic, that it was distributed to the defense establishment by the ministry's policy division, and “was not supposed to reach the media.”

‘Make It Clear There Is No Hope of Returning’

The document unequivocally and explicitly recommends transferring Palestinian civilians from Gaza as the desired outcome of the war. The existence of the plan was first [reported](#) last week in the Israeli business newspaper Calcalist, and the full text of the document is published and translated [here](#) [see Annex below for the full document].

The transfer plan is divided into several stages.

In the first stage, action must be taken so that the population of Gaza “evacuates south,” while the air strikes focus on the northern Gaza Strip.

In the second stage, a ground incursion into Gaza will begin, leading to the occupation of the entire Strip from north to south, and the “cleansing of the underground bunkers of Hamas fighters.”

Concurrently with the re-occupation of Gaza, Palestinian civilians will be moved into Egyptian territory, and not be allowed to return. “It is important to leave the travel routes to the south open to enable the evacuation of the civilian population toward Rafah,” the document states.

According to an official in the Intelligence Ministry, the ministry's personnel stand behind these recommendations. The source stressed that the ministry's research is “not based on military intelligence” and serves only as a basis for discussions within the government.

The document proposes promoting a campaign targeting Palestinian civilians in Gaza that will “motivate them to accept this plan” and lead them to give up their land. “The messages should revolve around the loss of land, making it clear that there is no hope of returning to the territories Israel will soon occupy, whether or not that is true. The image needs to be, ‘Allah made sure you lose this land because of Hamas' leadership — there is no choice but to move to another place with the assistance of your Muslim brothers,’” the document reads.

In addition, the document encourages the government to lead a public campaign in the Western world to promote the transfer plan “in a way that does not incite or vilify Israel.” This would be done by presenting the expulsion of Gaza’s population as a humanitarian necessity to win over international support, by arguing that relocation will lead to “fewer casualties among the civilian population compared to the expected casualties if the population remains.”

The document also says that the United States should be enlisted in the process to exert pressure on Egypt to absorb the Palestinian residents of Gaza, and that other European countries — particularly Greece and Spain — as well as Canada should help absorb and settle the Palestinian refugees. The Ministry of Intelligence said the document was not yet formally distributed to U.S. officials, but only to the Israeli government and security agencies.

A Wider Policy Discussion

Last week, the Misgav Institute, a right-wing think tank headed by Meir Ben-Shabbat, a close associate of Prime Minister Netanyahu and a former head of Israel’s National Security Council, published a position paper that similarly called for the forced transfer of Gaza’s population to the Sinai. The institute recently deleted the post from Twitter and from its website after drawing strong international censure.

The deleted study was written by Amir Weitmann, a Likud activist and, according to sources familiar with him, a close associate of Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel. Last week, on a Facebook page named “The Plan to Rehabilitate Gaza in Egypt,” Weitmann [interviewed](#) Likud MK Ariel Kallner, who told him that “the solution you propose, to move the population to Egypt, is a logical and necessary solution.”

This is not the only connection between the Likud, the Ministry of Intelligence, and the right-wing think tank. About a month ago, the Ministry of Intelligence pledged to transfer about NIS 1 million from its budget to the Misgav Institute to conduct research on Arab countries. If the Misgav Institute was somehow involved in drafting the ministry’s Gaza transfer recommendations, its logo, at least, does not appear on the document.

Sources in the Ministry of Intelligence said that the Gaza report was an independent study conducted by the ministry’s policy division, without the cooperation of an external party, but they did confirm that the ministry had recently begun working with the Misgav Institute, stressing that the government body works with various research groups with diverse political agendas. The Misgav Institute has not yet responded to queries for this article.

In addition, the Intelligence Ministry’s document was first leaked in a small internal WhatsApp group of right-wing activists who, together with Likud advocate Whiteman, promote the reestablishment of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and the transfer of Palestinians living there.

According to one of these activists, the Intelligence Ministry document reached them through the mediation of a “Likud source,” and its public distribution is related to an attempt to find out whether “the Israeli public is ready to accept ideas of transfer from Gaza.”

The Preferred Option

The chances of fully implementing such a plan, which would amount to the total ethnic cleansing of the Gaza Strip, are negligible in many respects.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has [declared](#) that he strongly opposes opening the Rafah Crossing to absorb the Palestinian population from Gaza.

He argued that the displacement of Palestinians to the Sinai would threaten Israeli peace with Egypt, and warned that it would lead to Palestinians using Egyptian territory as a base to continue armed confrontations with Israel. A similar plan has been presented in the past by Israeli officials, and until now, it too had not matured into a serious policy discussion.

Moreover, after weeks of reports that the United States was attempting to raise the possibility of moving Palestinians to Egypt as part of a “humanitarian corridor,” U.S. President Joe Biden [asserted](#) yesterday that he and Sisi were committed to “ensuring that Palestinians in Gaza are not displaced to Egypt or any other nation.”

I also spoke with President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi to share my appreciation for Egypt facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Gaza.

We reaffirmed our commitment to work together and discussed the importance of protecting civilian lives, respect for international...

— President Biden (@POTUS) [October 29, 2023](#)

The Intelligence Ministry document states that Egypt will have an “obligation under international law to allow the passage of the population,” and that the United States can contribute to the process by “exerting pressure on Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to contribute to the initiative, either with resources or with the absorption of displaced persons.” It also proposes conducting a dedicated public campaign aimed at the Arab world, with a “focus on the message of assisting the Palestinian brothers and rehabilitating them, even at the price of a tone that rebukes or even harms Israel.”

Finally, the document notes that the “large-scale migration” of non-combatants from combat zones is a “natural and sought-after outcome” that has also occurred in Syria, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, concluding that only the expulsion of the Palestinian population will constitute “an appropriate response [that] will enable the creation of significant deterrence in the entire region.”

The document presents two other options regarding what to do with the residents of Gaza the day after the war. The first is to allow the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by the Fatah party in the occupied West Bank, to rule Gaza under Israeli auspices. The second is to cultivate another “local Arab authority” as an alternative to Hamas. Both options, the document claims, are undesirable for Israel from a strategic and security perspective, and will not provide a sufficient message of deterrence, especially to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The authors of the study also noted that bringing the PA into Gaza was the most dangerous option of the three, because it could lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

“The division between the Palestinian population in Judea and Samaria and Gaza is one of the main obstacles today preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state. It is inconceivable that the outcome of this attack [Hamas’ Oct. 7 massacres] will be an unprecedented victory for the Palestinian national movement and a path to the creation of a Palestinian state,” the document said.

The document further argues that a model of Israeli military rule and PA civilian rule, as exists in the West Bank, is likely to fail in Gaza.

“There is no way to maintain an effective military occupation in Gaza only on the basis of military presence without [Israeli] settlements, and within a short time there will be internal Israeli and international pressure for withdrawal.”

The authors added that in such a situation, the State of Israel “will be considered a colonial power with an occupying army — similar to the current situation in Judea and Samaria, but even worse.” They noted that the PA has low legitimacy among the Palestinian public, and that based on Israel’s previous experience of handing over control of Gaza to the PA and Hamas’ eventual takeover, Israel should not “repeat the same mistake that led to the current situation.”

The other option, the formation of a local Arab leadership to replace Hamas, is undesirable according to the document, because there are no local opposition movements to Hamas and a new leadership is liable to be more radical. “The most plausible scenario is ... not an ideological shift but rather the emergence of new, possibly even more extreme, Islamist movements,” it said. The authors mention the necessity of “creating ideological change” in the Palestinian population through a process of what it likens to “de-Nazification,” requiring Israel to “dictate the school curricula and enforce its use for an entire generation.”

Finally, the document argued that if Gaza’s population remained in the strip, there would be “many Arab casualties” during the anticipated re-occupation of the territory, which would damage Israel’s international image even more than expelling the population. For all these reasons, the Ministry of Intelligence’s recommendation is to promote the permanent transfer of all Palestinian civilians from Gaza to the Sinai.

The Defense Ministry, the army spokesperson’s office, and the Misgav Institute did not yet respond to +972’s requests for comment by the time of this article’s publication. Any responses received will be added here.

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Annex: Israeli Intelligence Ministry Policy Paper on Gaza’s Civilian Population, October 2023

The following is an unofficial translation by +972 Magazine.

13 October 2023

Intelligence Ministry

Policy Department

Policy paper: Options for a policy regarding Gaza's civilian population

Executive summary

1. The State of Israel is required to bring about a significant change in the civilian reality in the Gaza Strip in light of the Hamas crimes that led to the "Iron Swords" war, therefore it must decide on a political objective regarding the civilian population in Gaza, which should be pursued concurrently with the overthrow of the Hamas regime.
2. The objective defined by the government requires intensive action to harness the United States and other countries to support this goal.
3. Fundamental guidelines for every policy:
 - a. Overthrow of Hamas' rule.
 - b. Evacuation of the population outside of the combat zone for the benefit of the citizens of the Gaza Strip.
 - c. It is necessary to plan for and channel international aid to reach the area in accordance with the chosen policy.
 - d. In every policy, it is necessary to carry out a deep process of implementing an ideological change (de-Nazification).
 - e. The selected policy will support the state's political goal regarding the future of the Gaza Strip and the final picture of the war.

4. In this document, three possible options will be presented as a policy of the political echelon in Israel regarding the future of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip.

Each policy will be examined in light of the following characteristics:

- **Operative** — The ability to execute operationally.
- **Legitimization** — International/domestic/legal.
- **The ability to carry out an ideological and conceptual change** among the population in relation to Jews and Israel.
- **Broad strategic implications.**

5. The three options under examination are:

- a. Option A: The population remaining in Gaza and the import of Palestinian Authority (PA) rule.
- b. Option B: The population remaining in Gaza along with the emergence of a local Arab authority.
- c. Option C: The evacuation of the civilian population from Gaza to Sinai.

6. From an in-depth look at the options, the following insights can be derived:

- a. **Option C - The option that will yield positive, long-term strategic outcomes for Israel, and is an executable option. It requires determination from the political echelon in the face of international pressure, with an emphasis on harnessing the support of the United States and additional pro-Israeli countries for the endeavor.**
- b. **Options A and B suffer from significant deficiencies, especially in terms of their strategic implications and the lack of long-term feasibility. Neither of them will provide the necessary deterrent effect, will not allow for a mindset**

shift, and may lead within a few years to the same issues and threats that Israel has been dealing with from 2007 until today.

- c. **Option A is the option with the most risks**; the division between the Palestinian population in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) and Gaza is one of the central obstacles preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Choosing this option entails an unprecedented victory for the Palestinian national movement, a victory that will come at the cost of thousands of Israeli civilians and soldiers and does not guarantee security for Israel.

Option A

The population remaining in Gaza and the import of Palestinian Authority rule

Location and Governance

1. The majority of the population remains in Gaza.
2. Israeli military government, in the first stage; subsequently, the import of the PA and its putting in place as the governing entity in Gaza.

Operational implications

1. Requires combat in densely populated areas. Involves risking our soldiers and requires a lot of time.
2. The longer the intensive combat continues, the higher the risk of opening a second front in the north.
3. The Gaza population will oppose PA rule (tried in the past).
4. Humanitarian responsibility — at the completion of the war, Israel is fully responsible for the population with everything that stems from that.

International/legal legitimacy

1. At first glance, it appears to be a less severe option from a humanitarian perspective, and therefore it may be easier to gain broad support. However, in practice, the option that involves retaining the population may turn out to be the worst option, as one can expect many Arab casualties in the operational stage, as long as the population remains in the cities and is involved in the fighting.
2. The execution time will be prolonged, and with that the time in which photos will be published of civilians wounded from the fighting.
3. Military rule over the Arab population will make it difficult for Israel to maintain broad international support and will lead to the creation of pressure to establish a PA government.

Creating ideological change

1. It is obligatory to construct a public narrative internalizing the failure and moral injustice of the Hamas movement, and to replace the old perception with a moderate

Islamic ideology. This process is similar to the de-Nazification carried out in Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Among other things, it is crucial to dictate the school curricula and enforce its use for an entire generation.

2. The inclusion of the PA in the education system poses a significant challenge as its educational materials, similar to those of Hamas, currently promote hatred and hostility towards Israel.
3. It is possible to negotiate the import of PA materials regarding Israel into the educational materials, although there is no way to ensure it will actually take place, as the PA itself fundamentally vilifies Israel.
4. It should be assumed that the PA will not act firmly to shape a public narrative of understanding the failure and moral injustice of the Hamas movement, nor will it work to promote a moderate Islamic ideology.
5. Even today, there is widespread public support for Hamas in Judea and Samaria. The leadership of the PA is seen throughout Judea and Samaria as corrupt and hollow, and it loses to Hamas in terms of public support.

Strategic implications

1. The PA is a body that is hostile toward Israel, which is on the brink of collapse. Strengthening it could potentially result in a strategic disadvantage for Israel.
2. The division between the Palestinian population in Judea and Samaria and Gaza is one of the main obstacles today preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state. It is inconceivable that the outcome of this attack will be an unprecedented victory for the Palestinian national movement and a path to the creation of a Palestinian state.
3. The current model of Judea and Samaria, with Israeli military control and civilian authority under the PA, is unstable and has an unclear future. It only endures in Judea and Samaria due to the extensive Jewish settlements throughout the entire region. This is because there is no feasibility of Israeli military control without the presence of Jewish settlements (and there is no expectation that the settlement movements will commit to the conditions of bringing the PA to Gaza).
4. There is no way to maintain an effective military occupation in Gaza only on the basis of military presence without settlements, and within a short time there will be internal Israeli and international pressure for withdrawal. This situation implies an interim state that will not gain long-term international legitimacy — similar to the current situation in Judea and Samaria, but even worse. The State of Israel will be considered a colonial power with an occupying army. Bases and outposts will be attacked, and the PA will deny any involvement.
5. **Attempted and failed** — It should be noted that the plan of handing the territory over to the PA and then removing military control was attempted in 2006 when Hamas won the elections and then seized control of the Gaza Strip. There is no justification for the Israeli nationalist war effort to occupy Gaza if in the end we repeat the same mistake that led to the current situation (an all-out war with Hamas).
6. **Deterrence** — This option will not achieve the required deterrence toward Hezbollah. On the contrary, this option points to a deep Israeli weakness that signals to Hezbollah that they will not pay a real price for a confrontation with Israel because, at most, it will execute a move similar to the one in Lebanon in the past — limited control for a while, and ultimately a withdrawal.
7. If the IDF fights to occupy the Gaza Strip, but in the end the political outcome will be the rule of the PA and a turning of the Strip once again into a hostile entity, Israel's ability to recruit fighters will be fatally damaged. Such a course of action would be a historical failure and an existential threat to the future of the state.

Option B

The population remaining in Gaza and the emergence of a local Arab authority

Location and governance

1. Most of the population remains in Gaza.
2. **Governance during the first stage** — Israeli military rule; as an **interim solution** — the continuation of attempts to build local Arab non-Islamist political leadership to manage civil aspects following the mode of the existing government in the United Arab Emirates. A permanent solution for this option does not seem to be on the horizon.
3. Humanitarian responsibility — fully rests on Israel upon the conclusion of the war, encompassing all implied consequences.

Operational implications

1. Requires combat in a densely populated area. Involves risks to our soldiers and requires a lot of time.
2. The longer the intense fighting continues, the greater the risk of opening a second front in the north.

International/legal legitimacy

1. Similar to Option A, this option will require combat in densely populated areas and will result in a significant number of casualties.
2. Its execution will be lengthy, and Hamas will seize the opportunity to use psychological warfare and publish reports of ‘civilian casualties’ allegedly caused by Israel within its framework.
3. Military rule over a civilian population will make it challenging for Israel to maintain broad international support over time.

Creating ideological change

4. In the current situation, there is an absence of local opposition movements to Hamas that could take its place. That is, even if a local leadership were to emerge in a style similar to the UAE, it would still consist of Hamas supporters.
5. This situation makes it challenging to create the necessary ideological change and the eradication of Hamas as a legitimate movement. For comparison, during the de-Nazification process in post-Nazi Germany, the new leadership was composed of individuals who opposed the Nazis.
6. In the absence of a broad local movement committed to the eradication of Hamas, achieving the necessary ideological change will be difficult.

Strategic implications

- In the short term, the overthrow of Hamas and the occupation of the Gaza Strip will constitute significant steps toward reinstating Israeli deterrence and changing the reality.
- However, it seems that the deterrence effect will not be sufficient and adequate in relation to the surprise attack. Moreover, the message conveyed to Hezbollah and Iran will not be strong enough. The Gaza Strip will continue to be fertile ground for influence attempts and the resurgence of terrorist organizations.

- It is reasonable to assume that such an operation will be supported by the Gulf states due to the severe blow that will be dealt to the Muslim Brotherhood, but the amount of casualties among the Gazan Arabs during the operation will make it more difficult.
- In the long run, there will be internal Israeli and international pressure to replace the Israeli military government with a local Arab government as quickly as possible. However, there is no guarantee that the new leadership will resist the spirit of Hamas.
- A local Arab government would face significant challenges in implementing the required narrative and ideological change, primarily because in Gaza there is an entire generation that has been educated under the influence of Hamas' ideology and now will also experience Israeli military occupation. The most plausible scenario is therefore not an ideological shift but rather the emergence of new, possibly even more extreme, Islamist movements.
- This option also does not offer Israel any long-term strategic value. On the contrary, it could become a strategic liability within a few years.

Option C

Evacuation of the civilian population from Gaza to Sinai

Location and governance

1. Due to the fighting against Hamas, there is a need to evacuate the non-combatant population from the combat area.
2. Israel should act to evacuate the civilian population to Sinai.
3. In the first stage, tent cities will be established in the area of Sinai, the next stage includes the establishment of a humanitarian zone to assist the civilian population of Gaza and the construction of cities in a resettled area in northern Sinai.
4. A sterile zone of several kilometers should be created within Egypt, and the return of the population to activities/residences near the border with Israel should not be allowed. In addition, a security perimeter should be established in our territory near the border with Egypt.

Operational

1. A call for the evacuation of the non-combatant population from the combat zone of the Hamas attack.
2. In the first stage, operations from the air with a focus on the north of Gaza to allow a ground invasion in an area that is already evacuated and does not require fighting in a densely populated civilian area.
3. In the second stage, a gradual ground invasion of the territory in the north and along the border until the occupation of the entire Strip and cleansing of the underground bunkers of Hamas fighters.
4. The ground invasion stage will be less time-consuming compared to options A and B and therefore will reduce the exposure time to opening the northern front simultaneously with the fighting in Gaza.
5. It is important to leave the travel routes to the south open to enable the evacuation of the civilian population toward Rafah.

International/legal legitimacy

1. At first glance, this option, involving significant population displacement, may present challenges in terms of international legitimacy.

2. In our assessment, post-evacuation combat is likely to result in fewer casualties among the civilian population compared to the expected casualties if the population remains (as presented in options A and B).
3. Large-scale migration from war zones (Syria, Afghanistan, Ukraine) and population movement is a natural and sought-after outcome due to the dangers associated with remaining in the war zone.
4. Even before the war, there was [significant demand for emigration](#) from Gaza, among the local population. The war is only expected to increase this phenomenon.
5. **Legally:**
 - a. This is a defensive war against a terrorist organization that conducted a military invasion into Israel.
 - b. The demand for the evacuation of the non-combatant population from the area is a widely accepted method that saves lives, and it was the approach used by the Americans in Iraq in 2003.
 - c. Egypt has an obligation under international law to allow the passage of the population.
6. Israel must act to promote a broad diplomatic initiative aimed at countries that will support assisting the displaced population and agree to absorb them as refugees.
7. A list of countries that are suitable for this initiative can be found in Appendix A to this document.
8. In the long run, this option will gain broader legitimacy because it involves a population that will be integrated within a state framework with citizenship.

Creating ideological change

1. In this option, too, there will be a need for a change in the ideological perspective of the population. However, Israel will not have the ability to control the plan since it will be implemented outside its territory.
2. Regarding options A and B, instilling a sense of failure among the population will help create an improved security situation for many years and deter the population.

Strategic Implications

1. **Deterrence** — This appropriate response will enable the creation of significant deterrence in the entire region and send a strong message to Hezbollah that they should not attempt a similar move in southern Lebanon.
2. The overthrow of Hamas will gain support from the Gulf states. Furthermore, this option represents a significant and unequivocal blow.
3. This option will strengthen Egyptian control in northern Sinai. Care must be taken to limit the entrance of weapons into northern Sinai and not legitimize changes to the disarmament clause of the peace agreement.
4. It will be necessary to engage in a broader effort to delegitimize the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and worldwide, and to transform the organization into an outlaw group similar to “Da’esh”— from a legal point of view, around the world and especially in Egypt.

Appendix A: Countries and bodies that can contribute to solving the humanitarian crisis in Gaza

The United States

Possible contribution: Assistance in promoting the initiative with many countries, including exerting pressure on Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to contribute to the initiative, either with resources or with the absorption of displaced persons.

Incentives: Interest in a clear Israeli victory and the restoration of the overall Western deterrence that has been damaged due to the attack on Israel. Restoring its status as a global leader and a key state for crisis resolution. An interest in creating significant regional change and dealing a blow to the radical axis.

Egypt

Possible contribution: Opening crossings and immediate absorption of the population of Gaza that will leave and gather in designated areas of Sinai; allocating land for settlement; exerting diplomatic pressure on Turkey and other countries to prioritize this over absorbing a large number of displaced people; providing a security envelope to the initial organization areas outside the Strip.

Possible incentives: Pressuring the United States and European countries to take responsibility and open Rafah Crossing for exiting to Sinai; financial assistance for the current economic crisis in Egypt.

Saudi Arabia

Possible contribution: Financial aid and budget allocation for the efforts to relocate the population to different countries; non-publicly, funding campaigns highlighting the harm caused by Hamas and damaging its image.

Incentives: Pressure from the United States in addition to a commitment to use the defense umbrella of the combat groups hosted in the region against Iran as a security guarantee; an interest in positioning Saudi Arabia as helping Muslims in crisis; Saudi interest in a clear Israeli victory over Hamas.

Countries in Europe and especially the Mediterranean — Greece/Spain

Contribution: Absorption and settlement.

Incentives: Absorption budgets and financial support to Arab countries for the benefit of this process.

Additional North African Countries (Morocco, Libya, Tunisia)

Contribution: Absorption and settlement; immediate assistance in areas of organization outside the Strip.

Incentives: Absorption and financial support to Arab countries to support this process; Muslim solidarity; pressure from European countries; action through contacts that Israel has with some of these countries in a way that will allow them to maintain these ties without harming their reputation among the Arabs of the world.

Canada

Contribution: Absorption of the population and its settlement within the framework of the permissive immigration policy.

Large advertising agencies

Possible contribution: Campaigns to promote this plan in the Western world and the effort to resolve the crisis in a way that does not incite or vilify Israel; designating global campaigns that are not pro-Israel and focus on the message of assisting the Palestinian brothers and rehabilitating them, even at the price of a tone that rebukes or even harms Israel, intended for populations that won't be receptive to any other message.

Dedicated campaigns **for Gaza residents themselves** to motivate them to accept this plan — the messages should revolve around the loss of land, making it clear that there is no hope of returning to the territories Israel will soon occupy, whether or not that is true. The image needs to be, “Allah made sure you lose this land because of Hamas’ leadership — there is no choice but to move to another place with the assistance of your Muslim brothers.”

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