The best scenario is that Algeria candidly explains its interests in this conflict to Russia and pledges not to provide any material support to the Tuaregs as a goodwill gesture for maintaining their strategic partnership.
Algeria’s Permanent Representative to the UN Ammar Benjamaa told the Security Council last week that “We need to stop the violations committed by private armies employed by some countries” in Mali after a deadly drone attack against the border town of Tinzaouaten where Wagner was ambushed in late July. His words implied that this Russian PMC was to blame for the civilian deaths there, which comes amidst simmering Russian-Algerian tensions over its role in helping Mali defeat terrorist-designated separatists.
Algeria disagreed with Mali’s decision to scrap the 2015 Algiers Agreement in early January that was supposed to give the Tuaregs partial autonomy after the several conflicts that they initiated over the decades to this end. That development sparked the resumption of hostilities that climaxed over the summer with the abovementioned ambush that was reportedly supported by Ukraine and Poland. Readers can learn more about the New Cold War’s latest proxy war here.
The preceding hyperlinked analysis warned that Algeria might align with Western interests in this conflict due to its national security concerns in spite of being dependent on Russian military supplies, which is gradually happening as proven by Benjamaa’s provocative statement to the UNSC. It doesn’t matter that he expressed it “diplomatically” since even casual observers could see that he was referencing Wagner and alleging that it’s responsible for civilian deaths in Mali like the US has previously claimed.
Nevertheless, there are limits to how far Algeria will go in this regard since it’s also simultaneously at odds with the West and especially the US over their support of Morocco with whom Algeria has been feuding for decades over the unresolved Western Sahara Conflict. Whatever material support that it might provide the Tuaregs (or perhaps is already providing) therefore wouldn’t be coordinated with the West, but it might very well coordinate political support for them as well as anti-Wagner propaganda.
From Algeria’s perspective, the Algiers Agreement’s granting of partial autonomy to the Tuaregs is the only way to sustainably resolve this long-running conflict on its doorstep, which is why it opposed Mali’s scrapping of that accord and is also against Wagner’s efforts to help it defeat those separatists. The resultant resumption of hostilities has also reportedly seen the Tuaregs once again align with religious extremists and caused a growing humanitarian crisis that’s spilling into its southern border.
It was this last-mentioned dimension that prompted Benjamaa to air his thinly veiled complaint about Wagner at the UNSC in a sign that Algeria believes that the Algiers Agreement could be restored if only Russia stopped providing military aid to Mali via its famous PMC. From Russia’s perspective, however, Mali is a privileged military-strategic partner that deserves full support after promoting regional multipolar processes through its role as the core of the newly formed Sahelian Alliance/Confederation.
It’s accordingly become the lynchpin of Russia’s “Pivot to Africa” that readers can learn more about here and here so there was no way that Moscow could deny Bamako’s request for military aid against its separatists. The regional Al Qaeda branch’s declaration of war on Russia in summer 2022 also contributed to these calculations too. The end result is that it’s not going to withdraw, neither in response to late July’s ambush nor under Algerian pressure, which could thus worsen ties with Algiers.
While respecting Algeria’s sovereign right to determine its national security interests and act upon them accordingly, it should also respect Mali’s selfsame right and thus do its utmost to avoid being dragged into the New Cold War’s latest proxy war. The extension of political support to the Tuaregs and spewing of anti-Wagner propaganda are one thing, but any material support to them would cross a red line in its ties with Mali and possibly also with Russia too seeing as how they’ve already killed some of its PMCs.
It also wouldn’t sway the West to Algeria’s side in the Western Sahara dispute either since Rabat has been their stalwart ally for decades unlike Algiers so there’s no use in thinking that this is possible. The best scenario is therefore that Algeria candidly explains its interests in this conflict to Russia and pledges not to provide any material support to the Tuaregs as a goodwill gesture for maintaining their strategic partnership. Anything less could worsen the regional security dilemma and turn these two into rivals.
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This article was originally published on the author’s Substack, Andrew Korybko’s Newsletter.
Andrew Korybko is an American Moscow-based political analyst specializing in the relationship between the US strategy in Afro-Eurasia, China’s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road connectivity, and Hybrid Warfare. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.
Featured image is from the author
