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THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL OF LEGAL CONSCIENCE

TEXT OF INDICTMENT of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Tribunal of Legal Conscience against Antonio Cassese, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Claude Jorda, Theodor Meron, Richard Goldstone, Louise Arbour and Carla Del Ponte

Pursuant to Articles 4 and 7 of its Statute, constituted by the Association of Intellectuals �Serbian National Conscience�, in cooperation with the Association of Cultural Workers �The Foundation of Truth� and the Association of Diaspora and Homeland �World Congress of Serbs�, the International Tribunal of Legal Conscience as a holder of moral judicial power shall try for criminal acts regardless of the fact by whom and where they have been committed, if so prescribed by the consideration of international justice, applying the rules contained in the Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of January 27, 1929, Swiss Criminal Code of December 21, 1937 (as subsequently amended and supplemented) and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of August 8, 1945.

Since Chief Prosecutor of the International Tribunal of Legal Conscience is of the opinion that Antonio Cassese, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Claude Jorda and Theodor Meron in the capacity of Presidents of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter referred to as �the Hague Tribunal�) and Richard Goldstone, Louise Arbour and Carla Del Ponte in the capacity of prosecutors of �the Hague Tribunal� have committed criminal acts of accepting bribe and trading by influence under Articles 384, 385 and 387 of the Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and under Articles 322 quater and 322 sexies of the Swiss Criminal Code, criminal act of support and official support, that is, protection (help to the perpetrator after the criminal act committed) under Articles 141 and 393 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Article 305 paragraph 1 of the Swiss Criminal Code, criminal act of abuse of official authority under Article 312 of the Swiss Criminal Code and Article 386 of the Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, criminal act of racial discrimination under Article 261 bis of the Swiss Criminal Code as well as a crime against humanity under Article 6 paragraph 2 (c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal over the period from establishment of that �Tribunal� in 1993, but particularly from the beginning of its start-up on November 17, 1994, and as succession in the aforementioned functions until producing of this indictment and commitment of these criminal acts or their aftermaths due to their commitment have resulted in arrest, judgement to prison, serious injury of health and death particularly of the members of the Serbian nationality committed by the members of other nationalities, by means of which international justice has evidently been violated, he, based upon Article 13 of the Statute of the International Tribunal of Legal Conscience, produces this

INDICTMENT

1. Against Antonio Cassese, an Italian national; the accused Antonio Cassese was a permanent professor at the Law Department of the European Union Institute, performing the function of the President of �the Hague Tribunal� from 1993 to 1997; now he is a professor in the University of Firenza (Italy);

2. Against Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, born on April 12, 1942, at St. Paul, Minnesota, a national of the United States of America, Afro-American (Negro); the accused McDonald is a lawyer, she was a judge, advocate and a university professor in the USA; in September, 1993, she was elected a judge of �the Hague Tribunal� and in 1997 was again elected to this function for the successive four years; in September, 1997, she succeeded the accused Cassese to the function of the President of �the Hague Tribunal�, wherefrom she withdrew in 1999;

3. Against Claude Jorga, born in 1938, a French national; the accused Jorga is a lawyer and he was Chief Prosecutor (Procureur G�n�ral) in the appellation courts in Bordeaux and Paris; he was a director at the Ministry of Justice also teaching for six years at the �Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature�; he was named as a judge of �the Hague Tribunal� in February, 1994, and from 1999 to 2003 he was its President;

4. Against Theodor Meron, born in Poland, a national of the United States of America, Jew; the accused Meron is a lawyer, an expert in the filed of international humanitarian rights and humanitarian law and a diplomat; he was with the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to become a professor of law in New York and Geneva; he is also active in the International Committee of Red Cross as well as in other humanitarian organizations; he is the President of �the Hague Tribunal� from 2003;

5. Against Richard J. Goldstone, born on October 26, 1938, a national of the Republic of South Africa, Jew; the accused Goldstone is a lawyer and was a judge of the highest courts in South Africa as well as a member of various international institutions specifically dealing with humanitarian law; he is a holder of a number of honorary doctorates in law: of the University of Cape Town, Jewish University in Jerusalem, University College of Maryland, Catholic University of Brabant in Tilburg, etc.; he is a governor of the Jewish University in Jerusalem; from August, 1999, till December, 2001, he presided the International Independent Inquiry on Kosovo; he was Prosecutor of �the Hague Tribunal� from August 15, 1994 by the end of September, 1996, performing at the same time the same function at �the Hague Tribunal� for Rwanda;

6. Against Louise Arbour, a Canadian national; the accused Arbour is a lawyer and was a judge of the Supreme Court of the Canadian Province of Ontario, then a bilingual judge of the Appellation Court of the same Canadian province; she is considered to be an expert in the field of criminal law; she was named as Prosecutor of �the Hague Tribunal� on October 1, 1996, holding the function until September 14, 1999; at the same time she was Prosecutor of �the Hague Tribunal� for Rwanda;

7. Against Carla Del Ponte, born in Lugano on February 9, 1947, a national of Switzerland; the accused Carla Del Ponte is a lawyer and she was an examining magistrate and a public prosecutor; prior to accepting the function in �the Hague Tribunal�, she was Chief Prosecutor of Switzerland; she was named as Prosecutor of �the Hague Tribunal� on August 11, 1999, starting to perform that function on September 15, 1999; at the same time she was appointed Prosecutor of �the Hague Tribunal� for Rwanda;

and proposes the International Tribunal of Legal Conscience as a competent instance to convene a trial invited to which will be Chief Prosecutor of the International Tribunal of Legal Conscience, the accused and, in the capacity of friends of the Tribunal or witnesses, - notifying that the list of friends of the Tribunal or witnesses may later be enlarged � Panajotis G. Haristos, professor of the Faculty of Law of the University of Athens, Greece, Raymond K. Kent, historian, professor emeritus, History Department, University of Berkeley, United States of America, Raju G.G. Thomas, professor of International Relations in the Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, United States of America, Alfred P. Rubin, professor of International Law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tuft University, Medford, Massachusetts, United States of America, John Peter Maher, linguist, professor emeritus, Chicago, Illinois, United States of America, J�rgen Els�sser, journalist, Germany (e-mail [email protected]) and Milivoje Ivani�evi*, journalist, Bulevar umetnosti 23/1, Beograd, Srbija.

Introduction: International Illegality of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (�the Hague Tribunal�).

�The Hague Tribunal� was established under the Resolutions of United Nations� Security Council No. 808 dated February 22, 1993, and No. 827 dated May 25, 1993, under the latter also adopted was the Statute of the aforementioned �Tribunal�.

The Security Council of the United Nations was not, however, empowered by any provision of both international law and law originating from the Charter of the United Nations to establish and regulate tribunals competent for criminal prosecution of persons responsible for violations of international humanitarian law, which is a statutory competence of �the Hague Tribunal� (Article 1 of the Statute of �the Hague Tribunal�). In this connection, no generally accepted scientific work in the field of international law mentions authorization of the Security Council of the United Nations to pass normative acts providing rights and obligations of third persons in the international relations, the acts having the character of �sources� of international law (see, for example: P. Guggenheim, Trait� de Droit international public, avec la collaboration de D. Kappeler, I, 2-e �d., Gen�ve 1967), while the Statute of �the Hague Tribunal� has indisputable character of the source of international law. The only way of establishing and regulating any international criminal tribunal that is in accordance with international law is conclusion of an international agreement and its ratification by the interested states. Starting from this point, some French eminent authorities in the legal science � Roland Drago, Charles Zorgbibe, Andr� Decocq, Adrien-Charles Dana (in the supplement to book: J. Verg�s, Justice pour le peuple serbe, Lausanne 2003, 107 sqq.) � voice the same standpoint: that establishing �the Hague Tribunal�, the Security Council has overstepped the boundaries of its competences. A mention is worth here that the only expert monograph in Serbian dedicated to �the Hague Tribunal� (its author is a former professor of the Faculty of Law of the University of Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina) discusses �that by the act of establishing the (�Hague�) Tribunal violation of the basic principles of international law has been done and the existing and increasingly present conviction confirmed that the international law order also exists to justify the moves, steps and plans of the powerful ones� (Dr. Mitar Kokolj, Medjunarodni krivi*ni sud za prethodnu Jugoslaviju (kome se sudi u Hagu?), Beograd 1995, 46).

Legal ground and authorization to establish �the Hague Tribunal� the Security Council has found in Article 29 and Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations of June 26, 1945:

�Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Chapter VII

Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of the failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effects to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3.

The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and the Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires to participate in the decisions in the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member�s armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council�s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the permanents members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee�s responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions related to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultations with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decision shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.�

The Security Council is not an international tribunal. It is possible to start from this apparently simple assertion of the most outstanding commentator of the United Nation Law, professor Hans Kelsen (H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations. A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems. With Supplement, New Jersey 2000. Originally published: New York 1950; 464 sq., 477) when establishing the competences of the Security Council and its boundaries. But, according to Kelsen, it is not a judicial organ because its members are not independent, but they are bound by the instructions of their governments. (According to him, the same also applies for the General Assembly of the United Nations). This is correct, but not sufficient: the Security Council is not an international tribunal for one reason more, because it does not pronounce acts arising from its competences, enforcement measures from Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations first of all, only as repression measures for the case of violation of law (which is in fact the material characteristic of judicial acts � see: L. Duguit, Trait� de Droit Constitutionnel, II, 3-e �d., Paris 1928, 423 sqq.), but also when, on the basis of its discretionary power, it concludes that those acts and measures are necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, regardless of the fact whether preceded by any violation of law or not. Thus, preventive effect is an essential feature of those acts and measures, so that it is why they may most rightfully be qualified as political administrative acts, �acts of government� (actes de gouvernement).

However, Kelsen also deems that the Security Council may establish international tribunals as its subsidiary organs under two conditions: first, to recognize independence to the subsidiary organ in question, and second, to transfer performance of its functions to that organ; the learned author has here in mind the function of solving disputes between states that otherwise belongs to the International Court of Justice as an original court of the United Nations, but which, pursuant to Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations may also be performed by the Security Council as a �quasi-judicial organ� if it is a dispute or situation prolongation of which may endanger international peace and security, not even intending to derive some right of the Security Council from the Charter of the United Nations to establish criminal courts to try individuals simply because neither the Security Council is invested with such a right; (see: Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, op. cit., 359 sqq., 476 sq.). Elsewhere in the same book Kelsen expresses doubt in the existence of the right of some organs of the United Nations to transfer rights they are invested with to other organs of the United Nations they themselves are not invested with, that is, not recognized to them under the Charter of the United Nations (ibidem, 194 n. 5, 938 sq.).

Upon establishment of �the Hague Tribunal� there appeared certain apologetic theoreticians of international law advocating a contrary thesis that the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations may establish judicial organs as their subsidiary organs, although neither one nor the other principle organs of the United Nations are invested with the judicial competence; a proof being the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations established by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the grounds of Article 22 of the Charter of the United Nations (�The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions�) under a Resolution of November 24, 1949. (See: A. Pellet, Le tribunal criminal international pour l�ex-Yougoslavie: poudre aux yeux ou avanc�e d�cisive?, Revue g�n�rale de droit international public, I/1994; E. David, Le tribunal international p�nal pour l�ex-Yougoslavie, Revue belge de droit international p�nal pour l�ex-Yougoslavie, Revue belge de droit international, II/1992.) But, that thesis is an ordinary mystification, since �the Hague Tribunal� and the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations essentially differ; only that the former is an international tribunal while the latter is not.

The Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations is competent to try disputes relative to violations of agreements on employment of personnel of the Secretariat of the United Nations or conditions on employment of that personnel. As such, the Administrative Tribunal is an institution of internal law of the Organization of the United Nations, which is, according to G. Schwarzenberger (A Manual of International Law, 5th Ed., London 1967, 243), one of the leading theoreticians of international law, �international authorized or postulated municipal law�. Also, D. Carreau (Droit international, 6-e �d., Paris 1999, 238), one of the leading modern authorities in the field of international law, discusses subsidiary organs of the international organizations that �municipal law� is here in question and �administrative decentralization� within those organizations. That �internal law� is, in the end, reduced to national law of respective member states of the United Nations. According to Kelsen (The Law of the United Nations, op. cit., 313 sq.), that the agreements the United Nations conclude with their personnel would be legally enforceable, they must be concluded on the basis of a national legal order. Accordingly, the United Nations and the United States of America concluded a so-called Headquarters Agreement on June 26, 1947 at Lake Success, which stipulates �that federal, state and local law of the United States of America shall apply within the headquarters district.�

A grave and obvious violation of international law was committed under the very Statute of �the Hague Tribunal�. That Statute stipulates in Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 that the concerned �Tribunal� is competent to try persons that committed grave violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of laws or customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity. The same Statute provides for under its Article 1 that the concerned persons will be put on trial if the crimes they are charged with were committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. However, The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 26, 1968, and which entered into force on November 11, 1970, expresses agreement of states signatories of the subject Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations in respect of the following crimes irrespective of the date they have been committed (Article I). Those are: �(a) War crimes as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nurnberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, particularly the �grave breaches� enumerated in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims; (b) Crimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nurnberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, eviction by armed attack or occupation and inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid, and the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, even if such acts do not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country in which they were committed.�

The accused, as lawyers of excellent education and experience � they are also a legal avant-garde of �the new world order� � must have obviously been aware that here presented contradictions exist. However, in spite of that awareness and in spite of their legal conscience, if any, they have performed (and still perform) the highest functions at �the Hague Tribunal�, that is, be it stressed here again, an illegal enterprise. That is why they are responsible not only as principal perpetrators, but as accomplices as well � instigators and supporters (Article 34 of the Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; Articles 24-26 of the Swiss Criminal Code) - of all criminal acts they are charged with under this indictment and in connection with the activity of �the Hague Tribunal�.

1.

The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia (�the Hague Tribunal�) received, at least over the period from 1993 to 1996, for the purpose of �voluntary contributions� from different states and persons certain amounts of money and contributions in equipment such as: US$5,000 from Cambodia, US$339,482 from Canada, US$5,000 from Chile, US$183,368 from Denmark, US$2,000 from Hungary, US$21,768 form Ireland, US$7,000 from Israel, US$ 1,898,049 from Italy, US$2,985 from Liechtenstein, US$2,000,000 from Malaysia, US$500 from Namibia, US$14,660 of New Zealand, US$1,000,000 from Pakistan, US$13,725 from Spain, US$75,758 from Switzerland, as well as contributions in equipment from the United States of America to the amount approximately estimated to US$2,300,000 (for the Prosecutor Office), from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland approximately estimated to US$31,700 (also for the Prosecutor Office), from the Institute for Open Society, as a part of the Soros Foundations, estimated to US$105,000, and from the Rockefeller Foundation estimated to US$50,000, particularly for criminal prosecution, arrest and judgement to prison sentences for persons of Serbian nationality that over the period from 1991 to 2000 were at leading functions (President of the Republics, prime ministers, ministers, generals) in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republic of Serbia, Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina, based upon which the accused have committed criminal acts of accepting bribe.

The Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes provides for in Chapter XXVIII (Criminal acts against official duties) under Article 384: (Paragraph 1) �A state officer (Article 14 No. 3) who requires or receives whatever present or whatever other benefit as well as who requires or receives a promised present or whatever benefit to perform or not perform whatever action he has, without that, to perform it or not, shall be punished to severe prison.� (Paragraph 2) �A state officer who upon an action or nonaction completed receives a present neither previously offered nor requested, shall be punished to prison.� The same Code further stipulates under Article 385: �A state officer who requests or receives whatever present or whatever other benefit as well as who requests or receives a promise of a present or whatever benefit to perform whatever official action that according to law he must not perform or not to perform an official action that according to law he has to perform, will be punished to penal servitude or imprisonment in a fortress up to a 5 years.� Finally, the same Code stipulates under Article 387: (Paragraph 1) �A judge, honorary judge or appointed judge, who for whatever court action, done or failed to be done, receives a present or whatever benefit, or requests or accepts a promised present or benefit, shall be punished by severe prison.� (Paragraph 2) �Should he or she do this for a court action he or she is to perform or not to perform later, shall be punished to penal servitude up to 5 years.� (Paragraph 3) �Should performance or failure to do a court action involves violation of law or whatever violation of the official duty, the perpetrator shall be punished to penal servitude up to 10 years.�

The Swiss Criminal Code, under Article 322 quater, stipulates as follows:� He or she who as a member of whatever court or other office, as an officer, as an officially appointed court expert, translator or interpreter, or as an appointed judge, requests or receives in connection with his or her official activity whatever benefit for himself or herself or any other person that he or she is not entitled to or accepts promise of such benefit for a prohibited action or nonaction, or for an action or nonaction standing in discretionary power, shall be punished to penal servitude up to five years or prison.� The same Code, under Article 322 sexies, stipulates as follows: �He or she who as a member of whatever court any other office, as an officer, as an officially appointed court expert, translator or interpreter, as an appointed judge, requests or receives with regard to the performance of his or her office whatever benefit that he or she is not entitled to or accepts promise of such benefit, shall be punished to prison or fine.� Under Article 322 octies paragraph 3 of the same Code also stipulated is as follows: �Equalized with the office bearers are private persons who perform public assignments.� (German original reads as follows: Art. 322quater: �Wer als Mitglied einer richterlichen oder anderen Beh�rde, als Beamter, als amtlich bestellter Sachverst�ndiger, Uebersetzer oder Dolmetscher oder als Schiedsrichter im Zusammenhang mit seiner amtlichen T�tigkeit f�r eine pflichtwidrige oder eine im Ermessen stehende Handlung oder Unterlassung f�r sich oder einen Dritten einen nicht geb�hrenden Vorteil fordert, sich versprechen l�sst oder annimmt, wird mit Zuchthaus bis zu f�nf Jahren oder mit Gef�ngnis bestraft.� Art. 322sexies: �Wer als Mitglied einer richterlichen oder anderen Beh�rde, als Beamter, als amtlich bestellter Sachverst�ndiger, Uebersetzer oder Dolmetscher oder als Schiedsrichter im Hinblick auf die Amtsf�hrung einen nicht geb�hrenden Vorteil fordert, sich versprechen l�sst oder annimmt, wird mit Gef�ngnis oder Busse bestraft.� Art. 322octies, 3. �Amtstr�gern gleichgestellt sind Private, die �ffentliche Aufgaben erf�llen.�)

Article 32 of �the Hague Tribunal� Statute regulates the question of its expenses in the following way: �The expenses of the International Tribunal shall be borne by the regular budget of the United Nations in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations.� Thus, there are no substantial legal grounds to finance �the Hague Tribunal� by means of the so-called �voluntary contributions�; therefore, they can legally be qualified only as bribe and in no other way. That criminal financing has been discovered by �the Hague Tribunal� itself in its bulletin (http://www.un.org/icty/Bulletin No2.htm), but only for a period from 1993 to 1996. Obviously, having understood that already at first glance something forbidden was in question, �the Hague Tribunal� ceased to keep the public informed on that.

But, it is hard to believe that the concerned Tribunal did not receive further �voluntary contributions� of the same kind. According to information from Christopher Black, a lawyer from Toronto (Canada), (An Impartial Tribunal, Really?, http://www.swans.com, 4) three out four first rooms at the Palace of Peace in the Hague to house the Office of the Prosecutor of �the Hague Tribunal� were hired by the Carnegie Foundation, a well known foundation from the United States of America. The same author (loc. cit.) equally reports that the accused McDonald expressed on April 19, 1999, her �deep appreciation to the U.S. government for its plegde of US$500,000�, which present was announced on April 16 in the same year by �Harold Koh, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State�, to finance the so-called �Outreach project�, through of which �the Hague Tribunal� gives a favourable picture on itself in the public, endeavouring to present its violations of law like something good in itself, first of all as �a decisive step in the construction of a new world order� (the accused Cassese, in: Black, loc. cit., 3). In connection with this, the words of the accused McDonald should be mentioned here, voiced on May 12, 1999, in New York (Black, loc. cit., 4): �The U.S. government has very generously agreed to provide $500,000 and to help to encourage other States to contribute. However, the moral imperative to end the violence in the region is shared by all, including the corporate sector. I am pleased, therefore, that a major corporation has recently donated computer equipment worth three million dollars, which will substantially enhance our operating capacity.� What is this if not a call to bribe!?

Accepting bribe appears in the utmost negation of the court independence; once corrupted, the court ceases to be an advocate and interpreter of law and justice and becomes a means of one who pays for its services. This is also particularly valid for the Prosecutor of �the Hague Tribunal�, because Article 16 paragraph 2 of its Statute in connection with him or her reads as follows: �The Prosecutor shall acts independently as a separate organ of the International Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source.� After all, �the Hague Tribunal� does not keep secret that its purpose is not to pronounce law and justice, �without fear or favour�, but to accomplish certain eminently political goals, such as creation of the �new world order� and �peace in the region� as desired by its donors. Consequently, that �Tribunal� is, due to its notorious bribery and political abuse, as righteously stressed by the lawyer Black (loc. cit., 5) �kangaroo court, a bogus court with a political purpose serving very powerful and identifiable masters. To be consistent with my thesis I will go futher and say that as a political instrument designed to violate, to destroy, the integrity and sovereignty of a country (Yugoslavia is meant here, author�s note), its creation is a crime against peace under the Nuremberg Principles�.

There are obvious and irrefutable proofs on collaboration and closeness of �the Hague Tribunal� with military and police and intelligence structures of the United States of America and their allies. Thus, the Prosecutor of �the Hague Tribunal� met the Secretary General of NATO (military alliance of Western States, but under the command and control of the United States) and the supreme commander of that alliance in Europe in 1996 to �establish contacts and start up discussions on modalities of cooperation and support�. On May 9, 1996, both sides signed a memorandum of understanding between the Office of the Prosecutor and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe � SHAPE. Further meetings, including a meeting of the representatives of �the Hague Tribunal� with general Wesley Crarke, were held afterwards. Practical arrangements for the purpose of support to the �Tribunal� and delivery of the accused persons to the �Tribunal� were provided for under that memorandum. Lawyer Black comments this as follows: �Nato forces became the gendarmes of the Tribunal, not UN forces, and the Tribunal put itself at the disposal of Nato� (loc. cit. 3). At a press conference held on September 10, 1999, the accused Carla Del Ponte, thanked, on her part, to the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States for help to the �Tribunal� and declared: �I am very appreciative of the important support that the U.S. government has provided the tribunal. I look forward to their continued support� (Black, loc. cit., 4).

Particularly significant is the corruptive connection between �the Hague Tribunal� and George Soros, the North American financial magnate of Jewish-Hungarian origin. Soros does not deal only with exchange speculations and worldwide improvements, through the network of his foundations of the �open society� as opposition to the �closed society�. But, even that opposition is extremely problematic. �Closed society� would be a nationalist (ethnic) and collectivistic community, while an �open society� would be a cosmopolitan and individualistic capitalist society. However, the principle theoretician of the �open society�, Karl Popper, a British national of the Jewish-Austrian descent, points out that the �open society� may be successful only if vested in �some form of capitalism�. (K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Princeton, N.J. 1950, 176). Popper stigmatises Plato, Aristotle and Hegel as the principle theoreticians of the �closed society�, pointing out K. Marx and Lenin as his, at least partial predecessors. (Popper, op. cit., 163, 298 sqq., 379 sqq.). A prototype of the �open society�, including to it inherent imperialism, is the United States of America, that waged more of wars, not counting those internal (against the Indians and the Civil War), than any other modern state. Soros, speaking about the United States of America mainly uses the term �we� (see, for example: George Soros on Globalization, Oxford 2002, 149 sqq.), supports and encourages the most far-reaching imperialism of the United States of America and NATO. He says: �I advocated military intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo and I am glad of the extent of American military superiority� (Soros on Globalization, loc. cit., 176). It is necessary, here, to deal with testimonies of Nora Beloff, writer and expert on Yugoslavia, in connection with the Catholic University De Paul from Chicago (USA), which collected information on criminal acts in the competence of �the Hague Tribunal�: �Recently, this University has established the Institute for Human Rights, financed by George Soros, the anti-Serbian Hungarian. He is exclusively engaged in demonizing Serbs, treating them as subhuman vagabonds� (cit. in: Kokolj, op. cit., 29). In connection with this, Soros has equally financed two Moslem organizations (Kokolj, op.cit., 27) and is financing the main anti-Serbian newspaper in Pri�tina which belongs to �Liberation Army of Kosovo� (KLA) (Black, loc. cit., 3). In addition to that, in open contrast to the Charter of the United Nations, Soros supports forcible establishment of the �new world order� as a �global open society�, applying armed force of NATO: �Without a new world order, there will be disorder; that much is clear. But which will act as the world�s policeman?... NATO has the potential of serving as the basis of a new world order in that part of the world which is most in need or order and stability� (G. Soros, Toward a New World Order: The Future of NATO, New York, 29 November 1993, 10 sq. On the �vision� of the �global open society� see: Soros on Globalization, 1oc. cit., 166 sqq.).

The standard criminal act of bribery exists when its perpetrator requests or receives whatever present or whatever benefit as well as when he or she requests or receives promise of a present or whatever benefit to perform or not to perform some definite official action. Accordingly, it is obvious that there is a connection between the acceptance of �voluntary contributions� and other benefits by �the Hague Tribunal� and its criminal prosecution in the sense of charging, trying and sentencing to prison sentences persons who performed the leading political and military functions between 1992 and 1999 in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republic of Serbia, Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina: Slobodan Milo�evi*, former President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and former President of the Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinovi*, former President of the Republic of Serbia, Nikola �ainovi*, former vicepresident of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Vojislav �e�elj, former vicepresident of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, Radovan Karad*i*, former President of Republika Srpska, Biljana Plav�i*, former President of Republika Srpska and the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, Mom*ilo Kraji�nik, former President of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, Milan Marti*, former President of Republika Srpska Krajina, Vlajko Stojiljkovi*, former home secretary of the Republic of Serbia, general Dragoljub Ojdani*, former chief of the Headquarters of the Army of Yugoslavia, general Neboj�a Pavkovi*, former chief of the Headquarters of the Army of Yugoslavia, Vladimir Lazarevi*, general of the Army of Yugoslavia, Pavle Strugar, general of the Army of Yugoslavia, general Ratko Mladi*, former commanding officer of the Headquarters of the Army of Republika Srpska, Djordje Djuki*, general of the Army of Republika Srpska, Momir Tali*, general of the Army of Republika Srpska, Radislav Krsti*, general of the Army of Republika Srpska and Stanislav Gali*, general of the Army of Republika Srpska. Because those persons were performing the leading political and military functions during the armed conflicts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina with Croatian, Bosnian-Moslem and Albanian allies of the United States of America and other member states of NATO, and in addition to that, and above all, that Slobodan Milo�evi*, Milan Milutinovi*, Nikola �ainovi*, Vojislav �e�elj, Vlajko Stojiljkovi*, Dragoljub Ojdani*, Neboj�a Pavkovi* and Vladimir Lazarevi*, were holding the commaning posts of the national resistance against the NATO attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that had commenced on March 24, 1999.

The best evidence that bribery is one of the causes of criminal prosecution for the aforementioned persons results from the fact that �the Hague Tribunal�, for the same criminal acts committed against the Serbs, prosecutes from the ranks of Croats, Bosnian Moslems and Albanians only worthless executors and some �scapegoat�, as well as that no member of the military and political structures of NATO has been charged so far. Thus, responding a question, on November 29, 1999, whether �the Hague Tribunal� will be ready to investigate the crimes committed in Kosovo and Metohia after June 10, 1999 (namely, after the NATO occupation of that Serbian province) or the crimes committed by others (NATO is thought of here) in the Yugoslav thearte of operations, the accused Carla Del Ponte declared: "The primary focus of the Office of The Prosecutor must be on the investigation and prosecution of the five leaders of the FRY and Serbia who have already been indicted" (Black, loc. cit., 4). That exclusive focusing may be explained only by the fact that �the Hague Tribunal� and specifically its Prosecutor, is a bribed instrument of the United States of America and its branch offices (NATO, Soros, etc.). Here, irrefutable truth should always be borne in mind that Serbs are, in fact, the greatest victims of expelling (�ethnic cleansing�) � as a crime against humanity in the sense of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (Aricle 6 paragraph 2 (c)) - during the ethnic conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. More than 600,000 Serbs lived in Croatia prior to 1991. It was already until November 5, 1993, that around 300,000 Serbs were expelled by the Croats, and then in the attack on Srpska Krajina at the beginning of August 1995, in a couple of days only more than 200,000 Serbs were expelled (Gregori Eli*, Invazija na Srpsku Krajinu, in: Ramsey Clark et al., NATO na Balkanu. Glasovi otpora (translation from English: NATO in the Balkans. Voices of Oposition), Podgorica/Beograd 2000, 115 sqq.). Also, Milivoje Ivani�evi* (Izgon Srba iz BiH 1992-1995, Beograd 2000, passim) proves, by a careful analysis of statistical data, that from the parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Moslems and Croats, the so-called �Bosnian-Croatian Federation�, 550,000 persons of Serbian nationality were expelled from 1992 to 1995. All that could have not been done to such extent were there no at the decisive moments heavy air raids of NATO on the Serbian military and civil targets (on the attacks of those air forces on Serbia in 1999, criminal acts of NATO committed in those attacks and terrorist acts of the Albanian terrorist groups in Kosovo and Metohia from January 1, 1998, and on, see: The White Book of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I-IV, Belgrade 1999-2000).

The above presented facts fully prove that the accused have repeatedly commited a criminal act of accepting bribe in its standard form. But, a criminal act of accepting bribe also exists when its perpetrator, in general in connection with the performance of his or her official duties, not only for undertaking or non-undertaking certain official actions, requests or receives whatever benefit he or she is not entitled to, that is, accepts a promise of such benefit (Article 322 sexies of the Swiss Criminal Code). Therefrom, it follows that the very acceptance of �voluntary contributions� and other similar benefits by �the Hague Tribunal� already represents a series of criminal acts of the accused, i.e. so much criminal acts of the accused how many individual �voluntary contributions� and other similar benefits there were accepted by �the Hague Tribunal�.

The accused, each one in person, have committed a number of criminal acts of subsequent bribery, that is to say, accepting bribe for already performed or failed official actions as �awards� for them. A heavier form of that criminal act is exactly subsequent bribery of the judges (Article 387 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). That can be seen from the continuity of �voluntary contributions� and other similar benefits �the Hague Tribunal� was showered with. That the �awards� of that kind did not stop pouring even after departure of certain �meritorious� persons from �the Tribunal� may also be proved by the fact that the accused Louise Arbour, requested to carry out the investigation on the war crimes of all chiefs of the member states of NATO, was awarded for not carrying out that investigation of one of the member states of NATO, Canada, by being appointed a lifelong judge of the Supreme Court of Canada (Black, loc. cit., 4).

The heaviest form of a criminal act of accepting bribe exists when the bribery is directed toward an action or nonaction involving breaking of law or violation of official duty or an action or nonaction standing in discretionary power. From the above presented factual evidence, a conclusion can be drawn that the accused have commited acceptance of bribe in that form as well. Since institution of criminal proceedings before �the Hague Tribunal� is an action undertaken by the Prosecutor of the Tribunal on his or her discretion, noninstitution of criminal proceedings for war crimes against political and military chiefs of the member states of NATO in connection with the acceptance of �voluntary contributions� and �awards� from those very states is, certainly, the heaviest form of bribery. But, evidence in the next parts of this indictment even more will support this qualification.

All documents quoted under this item of the indictment as evidence are published in a way that they are made accessible to the wide public and are also contained in the papers of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Tribunal of Legal Conscience.

2.

The nongovermental organization �Foundation for Truth about the Serbs� from Belgrade, presided by Predrag R. Dragi* Kijuk, brought criminal charge against Alija Izetbegovi* from Sarajevo to The International Tribunal for Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia (�the Hague Tribunal�) on February 24, 1996, as a possible war criminal and criminal against humanity, supplementing the subject charge with new evidences on June 13, 1998. Although contained in the concerned criminal charge is persuasive (prima facie) evidence that Alija Izetbegovi*, who had already been two times punished for heavy criminal acts of political nature, committed crimes he was charged with in the concerned criminal charge over the period of civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-1995), �the Hague Tribunal� did not take any action from the date of bringing the criminal charge to the death of Alija Izetbegovi* in 2003, for the purpose of his criminal prosecution, the highest and direct responsibility for the failure being on the Prosecutors of �the Hague Tribunal� who had to announce indictment against Alija Izetbegovi* for crimes he had been charged with, because the Statute of �the Hague Tribunal� in its Article 18 paragraph 4 stipulates that the indictment is prepared and transmitted to the judge of the Trial Chamber when the Prosecutor determines that prima facie case exists. Thus, the accused have committed a criminal act of support and official support, that is, protection (support to the perpetrator after the criminal act committed).

The Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes stipulates under Chapter XIV (Criminal acts against the Judiciary) in Article 141: (Paragraph 1) �He or she who thwarts or prevents an action to be taken against a person or plays into someone's hands to evade sentence for his criminal act or security measure, shall be punished to severe prison up to 3 years.� (Paragrpah 2) �He or she shall be punished for an attempt.� (Paragraph 3) �Under specifically hard conditions he or she shall be sentenced to penal servitude of up to 5 years.� Also, under Chapter XXVIII (Criminal acts against official duty) the same Code under Article 393 stipulates as follows: (Paragraph 1) �A state officer who, intending to save somebody from punishment threated by law, fails to do what he or she is obliged to do according to law, shall be punished to prison up to two years.�

The Swiss Criminal Code stipulates under Article 305: (Paragrpah 1) �He or she who thwarts criminal prosecution of a person or plays into someone's hands to evade execution of a criminal sentence or any measure provided for in Articles 42-44 and 100 bis, shall be punished to a prison term.� (German original reads as follows: �Wer jemanden der Strafverfolgung, dem Strafvollzug oder dem Vollzug einer der in den Artikeln 42-44 und 100bis vorgesehenen Massnahmen entzieht, wird mit Gef�ngnis bestraft.�)

The aforementioned supplemented criminal charge of the �Foundation of Truth about the Serbs� against Alija Izetbegovi* (its German version can be found among the documents of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Tribunal of Legal Conscience as body of evidence) has been drawn up by an expert team headed by Angelina Markovic and the members of which are as follow: Prof. Dr. iur. habil., Dr. Dr. Ferenc Majoros, Dr. Vera Bojic and Dr. Vladimir Umeljic (place and time of work of the team: Belgrade � K�ln, December 1997/May 1998). Neither �the Hague Tribunal� could neglect the authority and arguments of that expert team, so that way back on March 22, 1996, the accused Richard Goldstone informed �The Foundation of Truth about the Serbs� that the �subject of the charge had been received and submitted to procedure�. But, it was all the time that �the Hague Tribunal� rejected to inform �The Foundation of Truth about the Serbs� on the development of the prosecution against Alija Izetbegovi*, justifying itself by the �rules of procedure and the need of the Tribunal� � always with an explanation that all the materials sent by �The Foundation of Truth about the Serbs� �will be investigated� (Information of the Foundation of Truth about the Serbs to Dr. Vojislav Ko�tunica, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, forwarded on January 15, 2001, can be found among the documents of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Tribunal of Legal Conscience). Such treatment of the competent at �the Hague Tribunal� may be interpreted only so as that the accused were fully aware of their acts and their graveness, but, inspite of that, they were persistent in performing them.

In this case, it was one of the gravest kinds of supporting the criminal. Alija Izetbegovi* had already been sentenced two times for grave political criminal acts in connection with the crimes he was charged with by �The Foundation of Truth about the Serbs�, so that he could have been considered as particularly dangerous to society because of his �criminal inclination� pursuant to Article 70 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

Alija Izetbegovi*, a Bosnian Muslem, born on August 8, 1925, at Bosanski �amac (Bosnia and Herzegovina), graduated lawyer, was sentenced in 1946 in Sarajevo by the competent court to a 3-year prison term due to provoking national, racial or religious intolerance, hatred or discord, and served the full sentence he had been sentenced to; then on August 20, 1983, the competent court in Sarajevo sentenced him to a 14-year prison term due to establishing association the intention of which was to unconstitutionally change the federal system of the state and break brotherhood and unity of the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia; but he served the sentence for only five years and nine months and was set free in 1988.

Criminal actions of Alija Izetbegovi* has originaly been connected with the Islamic-fundamentalist and political organization �Young Moslems� the member of which he was since the age of sixteen. Foreseen, among other things, under the programme of this organization was unity of Moslems of all states into one worldwide Islamic state. After the Second World War, that organization featured underground activities. In February, 1949, �Young Moslems� were in the lead of an unsuccessful armed rebellion. Then, four of the leaders were sentenced to capital punishment, and a number of them to a long-term prison terms. In those times, Alija Izetbegovi* had already been serving his prison term as a founder and editor of an Islamic magazine named �Mujahid�. The subject of incrimination was a poem titled �To the Jihad� published in that magazine, through which the Moslems were invited to a holy war �to route the old and corrupt world�. Leaving the prison, Alija Izetbegovi* continued his activities in the illegal organization �Young Moslems�, as a member of its radical wing.

Izetbegovi*'s pamphlet titled �The Islamic Declaration�, for the first time published in 1970, was handed out by the �Young Moslems�. The goal of �The Islamic Declaration�, which was a basis of repeated criminal prosecution of Alija Izetbegovi*, was �Islamization� of Moslems and Islamic peoples, that is to say, their transformation into Islamic fundamentalist, and that �Islamic revival cannot be initiated without a religious revolution nor can it be continued and achieved without a political revolution�, consequently, without violence over the ideological rivals, particularly those of a different faith. The Islamic world, as seen by Alija Izetbegovi*'s declaration, must be organized into a separate religious state: �Under the present circumstances, this aspiration means a struggle to create a large Islamic federation stretching from Morocco to Indonesia, and from tropical to Central Asia�. And it is necessarily totalitarian: �The first and most important of these conclusions is definitely the one about the incompatibility of Islam and non-Islamic systems. There can be no peace nor coexistence between the �Islamic faith� and non-Islamic social and political institutions�. �Therefore, we must be preachers first and then soldiers. When will force be added to these means?�

With a group of his like-minded persons, Alija Izetbegovi* established a Party of Democratic Action in Sarajevo on May 27, 1990, obviously as a principal political means for transforming Bosnia and Herzegovina (possibly Sandjak as well, that is, a part of the District of Ra�ka in the Republic of Serbia) into an Islamic civitas Dei. Although its confessional character cannot be seen from the name of that party, it must have been clear to anybody that such party is in question: Foundation Rally of the Party of Democratic Action commenced with a pray in Arabic.

Multiparty elections held in November, 1990, featured a plebiscite vote of the Moslems for the Party of Democratic Action, in that way for the Islamic Declaration and all the consequences resulting from it. At the same time, Alija Izetbegovi* became President of the Presidency (a collective chief of the state), illegally holding that function to the end of the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 (because the term of the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina expired upon one year). At he same time, Alija Izetbegovi* was not only the President of the Party of Democratic Action and supreme commander of the armed forces of the Moslems of Bosnia and Herzegovina; intelligence service and counterintelligence of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and quasi military structure for conducting special operations were also under his direct command. Therefore, Alija Izetbegovi* was a dictator to the end of the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in those regions controlled by the Moslem military and paramilitary formations and responsible for all crimes committed by those formations.

Over the first nine months of his presidency, Alija Izetbegovi* paid a visit to a number of states under the Islamic fundamentalist power, first of all Iran and Lybia. The purpose of those visits was to obtain credits he needed to wage the civil war, and he obtained them. That transaction was formally unconstitutional, since Bosnia and Herzegovina was still a Republic of Yugoslavia, and responsible for obtaining credits abroad were exclusively federal organs. But, it is obvious that war was the most important thing to Alija Izetbegovi*. Well known is his widely cited statement of February 27, 1992: �I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, but I would not sacrifice its sovereignty for peace�. All that is fully in accord with his Islamic Declaration.

Since beginning of 1992, Alija Izetbegovi* engaged, within the armed forces under his supreme command, several hundreds of Islamic international terrorists, known as �holy warriors� or �mujahedins�, headed by the instructors from Afghanistan and Pakistan (on that see also: Miroslav Toholj, Crna knjiga. Patnje Srba u Bosni i Hercegovini 1992-1995, I-II, Cetinje 2000; it can be found among the documents of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Tribunal of Legal Conscience as body of evidence). Mujahedins killed their prisoners of Serbian nationality, military persons and civilians by cutting their heads and posing for Moslem newspapers with the cut heads of their victims like their trophies, proving thus that they were barbarians unworthy of the modern civilization. Using mujahedins, Izetbegovi* made himself obviously guilty of grave war crimes and crimes against humanity.

But, Izetbegovi* already used paramilitary formations and party militias in the Bosnian civil war: �Patriotic League�, �Green Berets�, �Black Swans�, �The Pidgeons of the Mosque� and the like. The cores of those troops were mainly criminals ready to serve Alija Izetbegovi*, because he set them free from serving their prison terms using his right of pardon, but there were also �guys from the streets�, according to acknowledgement of Moslems themselves. It was particularly in Sarajevo that the members of underground run their private prisons for Serbs and brothels with Serbian women as white slavery.

In spite of all stories of Moslems from Bosnia and Herzegovina about Bosnia and Herzegovina as a mulitethnic and multiconfessional state that were permanently spread all over the world through all available propaganda media, in a decree issued by Alija Izetbegovi*, Islamic salute �Asalamu Alaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh� was regulated as an official salute of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the territory under the control of that Army, a great number of buildings of the Serbian Orthodox Church were destroyed or damaged only during 1992 and at the beginning of 1993. 74 churches were destroyed and 79 severely damaged. Also destroyed was one monastery and 2 severely damaged. 12 cemeteries were destroyed and 11 severely damaged. 6 chapels, 2 commemorative places, 4 bishoprics, 1 episcopate treasury, 1 archive and 2 libraries. Consequently, spiritual genocide over the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina was in fact committed, perhaps again one act of political revolution foreseen under the �Islamic Declaration�?!

However, the most perfidious crime of Alija Izetbegovi* was repeated mass killing of the members of his own, Moslem people, with the aim of imputing these massacres to the armed forces of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska) and provoking military intervention of member states of NATO against them, the which states, however, looked forward to it, finding in it a good reason to openly stand by the Moslem and Croatian side in the Bosnia and Herzegovina civil war.

The mass killings discussed took place in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It was only in July-August, 1995, that the offices of the United Nations found out that the Moslem forces kept a mortar in a garage nearby the Ko�evo Hospital to open fire on the Serbian positions on the surrounding hills. Later, they would hide that mortar, and Moslem TV teams would come to shoot actions of the Serbian artillery on the subject hospital to present to the public a �flagrant� evidence in support of Serbian war crimes and of Serbian �inhumanity� in general as well.

On May 27, 1992, a bomb exploded in Vase Miskina street killing 16 people and wounding 14 of them who were queuing for bread. After that, the Security Council of the United Nations urgently imposed sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro; consequences of those sanctions that involved quasi total blockade and isolation were tens of thousands dead innocent people. However, real evidence against the Serbs has never been disclosed, but circumstantial evidences speak that the terrorist attack in the Vase Miskina street was made by the Moslems themselves. Thus, Lewis MacKenzie, brigadier general serving the United Nations, writes in his diary that his people, witnesses of the massacre in the Vase Miskina street noticed armed Moslems who had blocked the street prior to the subject explosion, and that the representatives of media were waiting nearby the massacre place and who, immediately after the explosion, began reporting on the event.

The most far-reaching consequences were those of the two Moslem terrorist provocations in �Markale�, the main market place in Sarajevo (known as Markale I and Markale II).

First, on February 5, 1994, a deafening explosion shook Markale, killing, according to the official version of Moslems, 68 people, but the number of the dead was later on decreased: Ostrankino, the Moscow TV, Channel 1, reported on February 13 of the same year on 34 killed. The official report of the United Nations on that massacre ascribed it to a mortar shell fired from the Serbian positions. But, many impartial sources have rejected that possibility. For example, Pazit Ravina, correspondent of DAVAR (Tel Aviv) quotes statement of Dr. Sevket Karduman, who had specialized traumatology in New York and who participated in taking the dead and wounded to the Ko�evo Hospital, that 80 percent of the wounds were inflicted from the waist downward and that some of them were burning wounds and hollow wounds, and that there were several cases of heavy bleeding due to open bone fractures. According to the same source, there almost were no foreign bodies or lesser shrapnel in the wounds, injuries were mainly internal. In connection with this, an Israeli ballistics expert has concluded that one mortar shell could not cause such destructions and internal injuries, so that it is most likely that a phosphor-filled cone shell was in question located among market cases made of laths.

Then, on August 28, 1995, new explosion on Markale killed 37 and wounded 85 people. The experts of the United Nations found out that again it was a Serbian mortar shell (120 mm). That was a reason for mass air raids of NATO on the military and civil targets of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the final result of which was imposition of such peace in the civil war of Bosnia and Herzegovina as desired by the United States of America and her NATO allies. However, Andrej Demurenko, a Russian artillery colonel, chief of the headquarters of the Sarajevo Sector UN Peacekeeping Mission for Bosnia and Herzegovina together with the British and French experts has found out that the mortar shot in question was fired at an angle of 170o, that is, from the position under the control of Bosnian Moslems. That fact was not kept secret neither from the leading politicians of the western states. Thus, Edouard Balladur, the French prime minister, in response to the question of the Paris-based �Le Nouvel Observateur� on August 31, 1995, confirmed that the Moslems did the massacre of their own people, �but they at least forced NATO to intervene�!

(There is also other convincing evidence of those Izetbegovi*�s crimes over his own people in the criminal charge of the Foundation for Truth about the Serbs against Alija Izetbegovi*.)

Now, it is quite clear, why �the Hague Tribunal�, in spite of obvious evidence, did not bring the criminal proceedings against Alija Izetbegovi*. Because those very forces proved under this indictment to provide �the Hague Tribunal� with the bribe, are at the same time co-perpetrators and accomplices of crimes committed by Alija Izetbegovi*.

3. The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (�the Hague Tribunal�) keeps in its pretrial confinement the accused persons particularly those of Serbian nationality for an unjustifiable long time and does not bring them to trial, which is contrary to the provisions of its Statute and international agreements � so that Mom*ilo Kraji�nik, the political leader of Republika Srpska, has been in pretrial confinment since April, 2000, being tried since February, 2004 � for the sole and obvious purpose of making the confined persons declare them guilty of crimes charged with under the indictment of the Hague Prosecutor, or testify against other accused persons, or in general make illegal agreements with �the Hague Tribunal�, since otherwise falsified documents and false testimonies appear as principal evidence on the grounds of which the indictments and judgements of �the Hague Tribunal� are based.

Slavko Dokmanovi*, a Serb, former President of the Municipality of Vukovar was arrested based on the arrest warrant of �the Hague Tribunal� in a notoriosuly gangster way. On June 25, 1997, the secretary to Jacques Klein, American general, the then administrator of the District of Srem and Baranja, obvuously with permission of the general himself, lured him to come from Sombor in Serbia to Croatian Vukovar for the purpose of discussions to be held with the general Klein concerning questions of importance for the local Serbs. But, immediately upon entering the territory of Croatia Dokmanovi* was arrested by masked soldiers, who read to him something like indictment (the so-called �secret� or �sealed� indictment with the contents of which the accused was to be acquainted upon arrest), and forwarded him to the prison of �the Hague Tribunal�. Also, the concerned indictment did not contain any evidence on Dokmanovi*'s criminal responsibility. According to official version, Dokmanovi* �committed suicide� by hanging in a permanently televiewed cell on June 28, 1998, so that it was obvious if not with the help of then in presence of the prison authorities, which could, but did not do anything to prevent suicide, so that trial could not be held.

Again, upon the arrest warrant of �the Hague Tribunal� and based upon a �secret� indictment not containing evidence on criminal responsibility, Dr. Milan Kova*evi*, of Serbian nationality, director of the Prijedor Hospital, Republika Srpska, was confined and then, for lack of medical care, died in the prison of �the Hague Tribunal�. On July 10, 1997, three apparently unarmed British officers came to the Prijedor Hospital expressing wish to personally hand over a �gift-parcel� of medicines for the hospital, bearing visible signs of the International Red Cross and born by an interpreter accompanied by the three officers, to the director. When they approached Dr. Kova*evi* and at the moment he reached for the parcel, the British officers aimed their so far hidden arms at him and told him he was under arrest and sent him to �the Hague Tribunal�. Immediately upon his arrival in the prison Dr. Kova*evi* suffered a light stroke, and after several days another one with heavy consequences. Request to set Dr. Kova*evi* free or at least to forward him to an adequate hospital was not granted by �the Hague Tribunal�. After one more heart attack, Dr. Kova*evi* died in the �the Hague Tribunal� cell on August 1, 1998.

On August 2, 2001, Radislav Krsti*, a Serb, general of the Army of Republika Srpska, was sentenced by the Trial Chamber of �the Hague Tribunal� in connection with the alleged �mega-crime� of the Army of Republika Srpska, so-called �Srebrenica massacre�, to a 46-year prison term (it-98-33-t) on the grounds of insufficient and obviously false evidence, first of all based on a notoriously falsified document � transcript of allegedly eavesdropped messages ostensibly caught by the intelligence officers of the Moslem Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Just in connection with the so-called �Srebrenica massacre�, �the Hague Tribunal� has also shamefully instrumentalized itself in the campaign, first of all conducted by the media from the NATO states, against the Serbian people for the purpose of satanizing the Serbian people as an element of genocide. Thus, Fouad Riad, African, the judge of �the Hague Tribunal� declared, on November 16, 1995, for �Agence France Press� on the alleged �mega-massacre�: �(A) truly terrible massacre of the Moslem population appears to have taken place. The evidence tendered by the prosecutor describes scenes of unimaginable savagery: thousands of men burried alive, men and women mutilated and slaughtered, children killed before their mothers' eyes, a grandfather forced to eat the liver of his own grandson. These are truly scenes from hell, written on the darkest pages of human history.� (English source: www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/Bosnia/Bos-Ch.1.pdf.1.22) However, no evidence on the Serbian bestialities the judge Fouad �was disgusted at� has ever been cited by the �prosecutor�. On the other hand, the concerned Fouad has never been brought to book nor suffered any consequences at �the Hague Tribunal� for his diabolic lies about the Serbs. Therefore, he has spoken on behalf of �the Hague Tribunal�.

Thus, the accused have committed criminal acts of abuse of official authority from Article 312 of the Swiss Criminal Code and Article 386 of the Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, criminal act of racial discrimination from Article 261 bis of the Swiss Criminal Code and the crime against humanity from Article 6 paragraph 2 (c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal.

Stipulated under Article 312 of the Swiss Criminal Code (Abuse of official authority) is as follows: �Members of an office or officers misusing their official authority in order to provide themselves or other persons with legally ungrounded benefit or to cause damage to other persons shall be punished to penal servitude up to a 5-year term or prison.� (In German original: �Mitglieder einer Beh�rde oder Beamte, die ihre Amtsgewalt missbrauchen, um sich oder einem andern einen unrechtm�ssigen Vorteil zu verschaffen oder einem andern einen Nachteil zuzuf�gen, werden mit Zuchthaus bis zu f�nf Jahren oder mit Gef�ngnis bestraft.�). Stipulated under Article 386 of the Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Official violation of law) is as follows: (Paragraph 1) �If a state officer, in peforming his office, desirous of benefiting or damaging a person, violates law, shall be sentenced to at least six-month prison.� (Paragraph 2).� If this shall be done by a judge, honorary judge or appointed judge in performing his office or in making decisions in judicial matters, shall be punished by imprisonment in a fortress to a 5-year term or prison�.

Stipulated under Article 261 bis (Racial discrimination) of the Swiss Criminal Code is as follows:

�He or she who publicly, against a person or a group of persons due to their race, ethnic belonging or religion, invites to hatred and discrimination,

who publicly spreads ideologies aimed to a systematic underestimation or slandering members of a race, ethnic group or religion,

who to the same end organizes or improves propaganda actions or participates in them,

who publicly in words, letters, pictures, expressing movements, violent actions or in any other way underestimates or discriminates a person or a group of persons due to their race, ethnic belonging or religion in a way that insults human dignity or from one of those reasons denies, in a striking way mitigates or tries to justify genocide or other crimes against humanity,

who some of his offered services, intended to the public, refuses to some person or a group of persons due to their race, ethnic belonging or religion,

shall be senteced to a prison term or fined.�

(In German original:

�Wer �ffentlich gegen eine Person oder eine Gruppe von Personen wegen ihrer Rasse, Ethnie oder Religion zu Hass oder Diskriminierung aufruft,

wer �ffentlich Ideologien verbreitet, die auf die systematische Herabsetzung oder Verleumdung der Angeh�rigen einer Rasse, Ethnie oder Religion gerichtet sind,

wet mit gleichen Ziel Propagandaaktionen organisiert, f�dert oder daran teilnimmt,

wer �ffentlich durch Wort, Schrift, Bild, Geb�rden, T�tlichkeiten oder in anderer Weise eine Person oder eine Gruppe von Personen wegen ihrer Rasse, Ethnie oder Religion in einer gegen die Menschenw�rde verstossenden Weise herabsetzt oder diskriminiert oder aus einem dieser Gr�nde V�lkermord oder andere Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit leugnet, gr�blich verharmlost oder zu rechtfertigen sucht,

wer eine von ihm angebotene Leistung, die f�r cie Allgemeinheit bestimmt ist, einer Person oder einer Gruppe von Personen wegen ihrer Rasse, Ethnie oder Religion verweigert,

wird mit Gef�ngnis oder mit Busse bestraft.�)

According to the Charter of the Interntional Military Tribunal, Article 6 paragraph 2 (c), crimes against humanity are as follow: �namely murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated�.

According to Article 20 paragraph 1 of the Statute of �the Hague Tribunal� �The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious�, and according to Article 21 paragraph 4 (c) one of the �minimum guarantees� entitled to the accused �to be tried without undue delay�. But, the Internatiaonal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 19, 1966, under its Article 9 paragrpah 3 stipulates: �Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or released�.

�The Hague Tribunal�, with respect to the Serbian accused, violates those provisions that undoubtedly bind it, as we have already said, in the most inconsiderate way. But, not only that those � as the most drastic example cited is the case of Mom*ilo Kraji�nik � for several years detained are waiting to be tried, but neither the indictments on the grounds of which they should be tried contain evidence of comportments they are charged with. Truly, the Statute of �the Hague Tribunal� does not provide for an obligation that the indictment shall contain evidence of the charging assertions, but lack of that obligation, together with a full arbitrarines of �the Hague Tribunal� when presenting evidence and estimates evidence against the Serbs, represents a severe violation of the modern European legal culture, so severe that the complete Hague trial is brought back to the times of Roman Catholic medieval inquisition. It is, therefore, well enough nowadays in Bosnia and Herzegovina whoever to point a finger at a Serb who, during the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, held an office in political, military or state structures in Republika Srpska and to accuse him or her for whatever crime insulting international humanitarian law that that Serb be, on �the Hague Tribunal� own volition, arrested, mistreated and sentenced, even killed; Simo Drlja*a, a Serb, former chief of police in Prijedor, was, according to an eyewitness, shot from the back, on July 17, 1997, by British commandos engaged by �the Hague Tribunal� when they, in several armour troop carriers and combat helicopters, wanted to arrest him by surprise. Allegedly, �self-defence� � of a man who had only a pocket gun on himself. But, it is obvious that any investigation should be disabled, the murderers took Simo's body with themselves to the seat of �the Hague Tribunal� (K. *avo�ki, Hag protiv pravde, Beograd 1998, 89).

According to Rule 101 of the Rules of procedure and evidence, adopted by �the Hague Tribunal� on February 11, 1994, on the grounds of authorizations from Article 15 of its Statute, and which was amended for 29 times by July 17, 2003, often granting retroactive effect to those amendments, manifesting thus its deeply rooted arbitrarines, �substantial cooperation� of the accused with the Prosecutor is �a mitigating circumstance�. Further, rule 62 ter of the same Rules leaves possibility of plea agreement between the accused and the Prosecutor. Both rules come from the archaic Anglo-Saxon criminal procedure, which is in many aspects culturally more inferior than the more rational continental European criminal procedures. But, the very act of adopting those archaic legal institutions is the arbitrarines, because they are strange and often unintelligible both to the accused and their defence attornies. In addition, the aforementioned rules are obvious violations of the provision from Article 21 paragraph 4 (g) (also one of the �minimum guarantees� entitled to the accused) �not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt�.

For, the purpose, from the proceedings point of view, proved to be their unjustifiedly long detention in the pretrial confinement of �the Hague Tribunal� just by physically breaking the accused to make them �cooperate� with the Hague Prosecutor and, possibly, �agree� with him or her, so that, in the absence of material evidence, they will testify against themselves and other accused � of course in false way. The �Srebrenica Case� clearly speaks on such tactics of �the Hague Tribunal�. Particularly those accused who have to take care of their families deprived of the means of susbsistence can easily give in under the pressure of the Hague Prosecutors �to agree� with them and thus sacrifice their conscience. Torturing detention of Mom*ilo Kraji�nik in the pre-trial confinement is, in all likelihood, also aimed to weaken that Serbian leader to the extent so that he could become a prosecution witness in the future proceedings against Radovan Karad*i*, should it take place at all.

A scandal in connection with the �agreements� with the Hague Prosecutor broke out when Momir Nikoli* was tried (it-02-60/1). Originally, Nikoli* �agreed� with the Hague Prosecutor that he had participated in the �Srebrenica massacre� by ordering thousand unarmed Moslems to be shot at Sandi*i and at the storehouse at Kravica on July 13, 1995. He was the first Serbian officer that �substantially cooperated� with the Hague Prosecutor in the �Srebrenica case�. But, Nikoli* denied that confession before the Trial Chamber of �the Hague Tribunal�, stating that it was false (Zorana �uvakovi* in �Politika� of November 12, 2003, www.politika.co.yu). �The Hague Tribunal�, however, remained at the level of its baseness, asserting that his confession of �guilt� is valid and sentenced him to a 27-year prison term on December 2, 2003.

Obligation of treatment in keeping with the good faith principle (bona fides, bonne foi, Treu und Glauben) also exists in international law (G. Dahm, V�lkerrecht, III, Stuttgart 1961, 107; Carreau, Droit international, op. cit., 148 sq.; Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, op. cit., 9, 34, 44, 148). Treatment of �the Hague Tribunal� and the Prosecutor in his or her office towards Slavko Dokmanovi* and Dr. Milan Kova*evi* also appears as a grave violation of that high legal and moral principle. Truly, when arresting notorious criminals � then and only then � legitimate state organs of prosecution may also apply immoral means: lie and deceit. The case is that �the Hague Tribunal� is not a legitimate organ of a state or a number of states. The act of establishing it is illegal, and many of its prisoners cannot be said to be criminals. Among those who are the least of the group are Slavko Dokmanovi* and Dr. Milan Kova*evi*. Therefore, all limitations applicable in international law must be most severely applied to all actions of �the Hague Tribunal�. Moreover, in the case of Slavko Dokmanovi* and Dr. Milan Nikoli* not only immoral actions are in question when arresting persons on whose blames there is no evidence, but it is also the case of post criminal treatment. The former was led to commit a suicide, the latter was left without medical care to die. Therefore, it is not only the question of the principle of good faith, but of violation of official duty as well, of racial discrimination and of the crime against humanity. Napoleon Bonaparte, the first consul of the French Republic, issued orders that the duke of Enghien, his political rival, would be kidnapped in the territory of a foreign state (Baden), and be sentenced to death by a French military tribunal and be shot on March 21, 1804. The then Europe called that act of Napoleon a murder (meurtre), the same attitude was also taken by the later historiography (A. Aulard, Historie Politique de la R�volution Fran�aise, 5-e �d. (2-e tirage), Paris 1921, 716, 771). It is obvious that contemporary Europe has different ethic measures - if any.

Particular colour to this crime of �the Hague Tribunal� and the shameful silence of Europe is added by the fact that Dr. Milan Kova*evi*, as a child, was a prisoner of Jasenovac, the Croatian death camp during the Second World War, where 600,000 Serbs, Jews and Gipsies were killed (E. Vlajki, Demonizacija Srba, Beograd 2001, 178; original title: E, Vlajki, Demonization of Serbs � the Western Imperialism and Media War Criminals, Ottawa/Ontario 2001) run by the Franciscans (K. Deschner/M. Petrovi*. Krieg der Religion. Der ewige Kreuzzug auf dem Balkan, 2. Aufl., M�nchen 1999, 274).

Particularly concrete evidence that �the Hague Tribunal� exerts racial discrimination against the Serbs is the trial of Dra*en Erdemovi*, Croat (it-96-22). Like Momir Nikoli*, Erdemovi* �has confessed� � although not accused previously at all � that he, as a member of the Army of Republika Srpska, participating in shooting 1,200 Moslems nearby Srebrenica on July 16, 1995 (or approximately that date), had killed between 70 and several hundred persons (*avo�ki, loc. cit., 71 sqq). For that �war crime� he was sentenced by �the Hague Tribunal� on March 5, 1998, to a 5-year prison term only. (Erdemovi* served that sentence in 2001 in Norway and from that time he is at large). Compared with this unusually mild punishment and in view of the kind and weight of that real or fabricated crime (for, except the confession of the accused that always may be false as well, there is no any other evidence that thousand and even more Moslems had been killed in the �Srebrenica massacre�) can also be the judgement pronounced by �the Hague Tribunal� to Du�ko Tadi*, one more Serb. On January 26, 2000, Tadi* was sentenced to a 20-year prison term because he, as a reserve policeman, had beaten the arrested Moslems and allegedly killed two Moslem policemen. The difference between the 5- and 20-year prison term from the criminal act kind and weight point of view in the case of Erdemovi*, on the one hand, and the two Serbs, Nikoli* and Tadi*, on the other hand, can only be explained if we start from the point that one of the principal criteria for rendering judgements in those cases was national belonging of the accused.

The very technique of proving established by �the Hague Tribunal� provides maximum arbitrarines in rendering judgements, on the one hand, and minimum possibility of defence, on the other hand. The witnesses identity can permanently be hidden cancelling their personal data from the tribunal minutes as well as distortion of their voices and appearance by certain techniques, the information acquired can remain confidential and its source made unknown, the Prosecutor can, by means of a discretionary decision, deprive the defence attorney of the insight into evidence he or she has provided for, without being obliged to explain the decision. On the contrary, �the Hague Tribunal� can remove the defence attorney from the proceedings if he or she is too zealous in his or her enagement, if his or her conduct is scandalous or offensive, or if in any other way disturbs the proceedings. In connection with this the defence attorney can be punished by �the Hague Tribunal�. Nothing of the kind, however, can befall the Prosecutor. (Pointing to this is Mirko Tripkovi* in his letter to the Belgrade-based bar dated June 16, 2001; see also: *avo�ki, loc. cit., 28 sqq., 43 sqq.)

�The Hague Tribunal�, rightfully says Miroslav Toholj, writer (Crna knjiga, II, op. cit., 514), �represented, it was increasingly obvious, continuation of the practice exercised since the outbreak of the war by the Moslem and Croatian authorities towards the arrested Serbs, the guilt of which was already supported by the very fact that they had been arrested. The incriminating confessions were obtained from anyone who fell into the executioners' hands by the already described methods. In the case of the Hague Tribunal as well, those unfortunates to be arrested were in a situation to prove their innocence over years. Consequently, by far heaviest qualifications could be rightfully attributed to the Hague Prosecutors than to the prosecutors and judges who conducted investigations and organized trials in the Moslem camps of the people by chance fallen into their hands.�

The highest degree in falsifying evidence, next to outdoing itself, �the Hague Tribunal� has reached in the �Srebrenica case� where it had to back up the assertion presented in the judgement to general Radislav Krsti* that the members of the Army of Repuiblika Srpska under his command killed 7 to 8 thousand of previously captured male Moslems.

The very number of the killed is a figment of the ultimately fired anti-Serbian imagination. It is, therefore, necessary to carry out an objective and in-depth analysis of the �the Srebrenica case� � of highest possible support in that job are, first of all, findings of Milivoje Ivani�evi*, an outstanding researcher, published in �Kni*evne novine� of April 15 - June 15, 2003, and of June 15 � August 15, 2003 (Nos. 1080-1083 and 1084-1087) under the title �Srebreni*ke nedore*enosti�.

Prior to the outbreak of the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srebrenica was a town predominantly inhabitated by Moslems, but inhabitants of the most of its vicinal settlements and surrounding villages were predominantly of Serbian nationality. Upon the oubreak of clashes between the Moslems and the Serbs, both the Serbs and the Moslems began to massively leave Srebrenica. In that situation, after the negotiations between the Serbian Democtratic Party and the Moslem Party of Democratic Action had failed, the Serbian power was first established in Srebrenica on April 19, 1992. In spite of all that, already on May 9 of the same year, the Serbs left Srebrenica, probably because they were frightened by the ambush murder of their leader Goran Zeki* commited by the Moslems. Then, Srebrenica was occupied by the Moslems and transformed into their place d'armes (finally, it was there that the 28th Raiding Division of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was functioning). Since then, golghota of the Serbian civil population of the district of Srebrenica commenced, which became a helpless victim of the repeated Moslem attacks: 72 Serbian settlements were robbed and burnt down, more than twelve hundred of Serbs, who could not escape, were killed. Thus, the Serbian population was reduced to 9 percent of the prewar status. The Moslem attacks were usually undertaken at the time of great Ortodox holidays - Christmas, St. George's Day, Ascension Day, St. Vitus' Day, St. Peter's Day � making it plain that those attacks had a character of the �holy war�, jihad. Almost all the Serbian inhabitants who happened to be in the occupied villages would be massacred by the Moslems, often burnt in their own houses. (Detailed data on those victims and their murderers can be found in the following books: Toholj, Crna knjiga, II, op. cit., 208 sqq, 231; M. Ivani�evi*, Hronika na�eg groblja � ili slovo o stradanju Srpskog naroda Bratunca, Mili*a, Skelana i Srebrenice, Beograd/Bratunac 1994, passim.)

Following the Moslem warriors was a far numerous �logistics� consisting of old men, women, even children, equipped with sticks, axes, bayonets, on tractors, trucks, cultivators and horse teams and led by the yesterday's neighbours as connoisseurs of the �terrain�; those �working platoons� would thoroughly plunder each house and take away all the cattle except swines (which would be killed); they would desecrate and disgrace human bodies; almost complete Moslem populations was included in that hell dance of the holy war. Is not that, perhaps, the reason why �the Hague Tribunal�, in its judgement to general Krsti* (point 116) named that and such Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina a �reasonable army� and proclaimed the power of Moslems in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the indictment against Milomir Staki* (it-97-24-pt) as �legal power of Bosnia and Herzegovina�?! (The last is also against international law, which does not know �legal�, but only �effective� powers; Dahm, V�lkerrecht, op. cit., I, 77 sqq., 122 sqq.)

But, from February, 1993, counteroffensive of the Drina Corps of the Army of Republika Srpska, formed only on November 1, 1992, is on, now in the opposite direction. However, after their successes � almost all Serbian settlements in the district of Srebrenica occupied so far were recaptured and Serbian soldiers were approaching the outskirts of the town now filled with Moslem refugees � the so-called �international community� came into play: under the Resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations of April 16, 1993, Srebrenica and its surroundings were placed under the protection of the United Nations (and some other towns under the control of Moslem power were also proclaimed �protected zones�: Sarajevo, Biha*, Gora*de, *epa). Only that the Security Council this time, too, as otherwise so many times during the �Yugoslav crisis�, misused law. Creating �protected zones�, it did not want to primarily help by the war hit citizens as well as the war prisoners, what was the intention of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), adopted on 8 June 1977, but to save the Moslem Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina from defeat which, without creating the �protected zones� within which the main parts of that Army and military industry were found refuge, would be inevitable. The aforementiond Protocol, in its Article 60, referring to demilitarized zones, precisely stipulates under paragraphs 1, 3, 6 and 7 conditions which should be satisfied by a such zone: Paragraph 3, �(a) All combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment, must have been evacuated; (b) No hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments; (c) No acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population; and (d) Any activity linked to the military effort must have ceased. ...� Sanction for nonfulfilment of any of these conditions is provided for under paragraph 7: �If one of the Parties to the conflict commits a material breach of the provisions of paragraphs 3 or 6, the other Party shall be released from its obligations under the agreement conferring upon the zone the status of demilitarized zone. In such an eventuality, the zone loses its status...�

Neither the Moslem troops in the �protected zones� disarmed themselves nor the forces of the United Nations underook anything to disarm them. On the contrary, those troops were permanently provided with new arms and military equipment. Thus, those �protected zones� proved to be a mere legal fiction. As for Srebrenica, the 28th Moslem Division undertook offensive actions beyond the zone it was protected in. On May 28, 1995, its soldiers attacked the village Kru�ev Do and massacred there five woodcutters of Serbian nationalty. Then, on June 26, 1995, they attacked Vi�njica, a Serbian village, and burnt it down. Particularly worth mentioning with Srebrenica is the fact that the Security Council of the United Nations made one more violation of law including a number of Serbian villages into the area of the �protected zone�, which had earlier been devasted and occupied by the Moslems. Those were: Bibi*i, Osredak, Jasenova, Viogor, *i*evci, Biljeg and other. All that made the Serbs decide to come back to Srebrenica, at least by force.

The units of the Drina Corps of the Army of Republika Srpska entered Srebrenica on July 12, 1995, without fighting because the outnumbering troops of the 28th Moslem Division had previously run away, leaving behind many of their wounded soldiers and civils, their relatives and dependents to be cared of by the Serbian military and civil authorities.

Those authorities, in cooperation with the international humanitarian organizations, evacuated the Moslem refugees, around 30,000 of them, from Srebrenica to the territory of the Tuzla canton where they were taken over by the Moslem authorities. The Moslem wounded were transferred to the Ko�evo Hospital in Sarajevo for further medical treatment (Vlajki, op. cit., 294, quoting New York Times).

Already on July 20, 1995, there were rumours that the soldiers of the Army of Republika Srpska had killed between 6,000 and 12,000 unarmed Moslems in the surroundings of Srebrenica over the period from July 12 to 15 of the same year. Who could be those Moslems? At first, the soldiers of the 28th Division and civil governors of Srebrenica were thought of who were with them, under the condition that they had been taken captive upon their runaway from Srebrenica. However, according to the assertions of the very Moslem sources, that taking captive could not have happened. That Division, suffering substantial losses during its movements, succeeded in geting thorugh the Serbian siege to the territory under the Moslem control; then, its troops were disposed to other Moslem military units (Vlajki, op. cit., 293 sq., also quoting the London-based Times of August 2, 1995; Toholj, Crna knjiga, II, op. cit., 242 sqq.).

Experts in the service of �the Hague Tribunal� had discovered in the �surroundings� of Srebrenica (sometimes for more tens of kilometers far from that town) several mass grave sites and found out around 2,100 �remnants of (human) bodies in them�. Corpses of 370 males with hands tied up were found, who may be said with certainty to have been executed. Hardly around fifty exhumated people were found out to be Moslems.

Therefore, there is no material evidence on the mass executed Moslems nearby Srebrenica in July, 1995, as a Serbian �mega-crime�. In the wider surroundings of that town, during almost the whole civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina military activities were waged in which there were a lots of victims both on the Serbian and the Moslem sides. At the very outbreak of the war there were more than 1,200 casualties on the Serbian side, while those of the 28th Moslem Divisions, according to the Moslem sources, were over 1,500 of killed and lost (Toholj, Crna knjiga II, 234). Therefore, burial of the dead in the mass grave sites was inevitable due to danger of contagion. Those dead, who were the victims during the whole war were, in all likelihood, discovered by �the Hague Tribunal�. But, it is of paramount importance to note that the Serbs were not allowed to witness the exhumations, to establish the number of the dead and causes of death in the �Srebrenica case�. In view of the already established tendency in the practice of �the Hague Tribunal� to accuse and sentence the Serbs at all costs, appropriate and grounded is a doubt that buried into the Srebrenica grave sites were additionally those who were killed or died at other places of Bosnia and Herzegovina so that the Serbs could be as convincigly accused as possible for the �Srebrenica massacre�.

At the trial of general Krsti*, handled at �the Hague Tribunal� was an apparently important, but essentially untrustworthy document, a list of persons missing upon the Serbian comeback to Srebrenica made by the International Committee of Red Cross. There are 7,481 names in that list. Milivoje Ivani�evi*, who had thoroughly studied that list, says: �How was that list made and is it valid at all? This is the only matter nobody deals with. The 1995 missing persons, after the Serbs had entered Srebrenica, could be, even without an elementary control by the registering person, reported by anyone. No objection could be made here to the International Committee of Red Cross. The reports were being submitted by persons who introduced themselves, often without any proofs, as members of the family, colleagues, friends, fellow soldiers, neighbours. That list, without any further actions or controls, was proclaimed and transformed into the list of the Srebrenica victims, and further on, transformed into the list of massacred Moslem civilians.� Some of those persons are not Moslems, but belong to other nationalities. Some of them were registered for two times, some were registered by the last name only, while some persons did not exist at all. Included into the list were names of 500 persons that had died before the Serbs entered Srebrenica. Some of the persons in the list were proved to be still alive. Thus, 3,016 persons from the list cast their ballot at the electrions held in September 1996 (see also: Vlajki, op. cit., 294). Since 36 persons out of the total number of persons in the list are females and only around 50 older juveniles, Ivani�evi* concludes that the rest of the dead given in the list, are persons subject to military conscription, that is, members of the 28th Moslem Division of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina who were killed in different conflicts with the Serbs.

Only, the motto of �the Hague Tribunal� is, if not through truth, then why not through lies, even those most impudent. Thus, in the proceedings against general Krsti*, allegedly eavesdropped conversations of general Krsti* appear as key evidence in which he charges himself for the �Srebrenica massacre�, the recordings of which were made by the intelligence officers of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a �reasonable army�, according to �the Hague Tribunal�.

Evidencing power of those recordings is refuted by the most simple linguistic analysis. Both the Serbs and the Moslems in Bosnia and Herzegovina speak �tokavian dialect of the same language. The Serbs and the Moslems in Bosnia and Herzegovina use jekavian pronunciation in contrast to the Serbs in Serbia who use ekavian pronunciation. The Moslems in Bosnia and Herzegovina also speak jekavian, but in western Bosnia here and there they speak ikavian; in any case with the jekavian Moslems ingredients of ikavian pronuncianton can be encountered, which cannot be found with the Serbs. The Serbs are only either ekavian or jekavian, both ekavian and jekavian pronunications are encountered in western Serbia. Here are some examples of the ikavian pronunciation from the folk songs of the Moslems in Bosnia and Herzegovina (taken from: Antun Hangi, *ivot i obi*aji Muslimana u Bosni i Hercegovini, 3rd ed., Sarajevo 1990, 168, 188, 189:)

�Dear sister-in-law, don't be sorry for your mother,

They say better mother for you here (ovdi).

Dear sister-in-law, don't be sorry for your father,

They say better father for you here (ovdi).

Dear sister-in-law, don't be sorry for your palace,

They say better palace for you here (ovdi).

In that tower, brothers, still flowing is

Still flowing is the milk (mliko) of the mother.

It is where (di) his blond head had rolled down,

It is there (tudi) that the turbeh (burial chamber) was errected (namistilo),

Was errected (namistilo) by no man's hands.�

(Words typed in bold belong to the ikavian pronunciation.)

It is obvious that a team of forgers from the �reasonable army� of the Moslems from Bosnia and Herzegovina was not aware of these linguistic nuances, so that is why their pronunciation, that is, mixture of jekavian and ikavian along with some ekavian word, was put into the mouth of the Serbian officers from Bosnia and Herzegovina, probably that the matter, as it seemed to them, would be more convincing. Here are examples from the judgement to general Krsti*:

Point 403, allegedly speaking is the Serbian officer Vujadin Popovi*, one of the key persons in the alleged �Srebrenica massacre�, who is, by the way, once �colonel�, once �lieutenant colonel�: �Hello, Popovi* speaking ... boss ... everything is O.K., that business is done ... everything is O.K. ... everything is brought to a close, no problems ... I am here (ovdi) on the spot (mjestu) � I am here (ovdi) on the spot (mjestu) where (gdje) I have been earlier (prije) you know... at the base I am, at the base. Could I only get some rest, get some rest to take a bath and I�ll think again about later on (posle)... that (business) is mostly for A ... for A ... that grade (ocenu) A everything is O.K. ... now goodbye so long (*ivio) �. Here, the first word printed in bold is ikavian, the second one is jekavian, the third one is ikavian, the fourth, fifth and sixth ones are jekavian, the seventh and eighth ones are ekavian and the ninth one is jekavian-ikavian. Under point 401 the same Popovi* is first ekavian: �Here, where (ovde de) I am ... you know where (de) I am.� And then jekavian: �Eh, we have received his extraordinary report (izvje�taj).� Finally, first jekavian and then ekavian in the two successive sentences, pronouncing the same word � time � first in jekavian and then in ekavian: �Yes, they have arrived ... they are there, there, but not timely (vrijeme) engaged and so it is. And the others have arrived, have arrived, but are late and have not been timely (vreme) engaged and that is why the commander is here (ovde), that one who had problems.� Sapienti sat.

No additional explanations of the monstrous lies and harangue of the judge Fouad Riad of �the Hague Tribunal� against the Serbs are needed; they speak enough for themselves. Nobody in history has said such provoking and repulsive words so far against the Serbian people like that African judge. They put him in line with J. Streicher, a German national socialist, the �preacher of hatred against the Jews�. But, while Streicher was brought to book for his preaching and strangled in Nuremberg on October 10, 1946, the judge Riad enjoying all due honours is still trying at �the Hague Tribunal�, and it was just he who was the member of the Trial Chamber which has sentenced general Krsti*.

All documents cited under this item of the indictment as supporting evidence have been published in a way to be accessible to a wide public and are also contained within the documents of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Tribunal of Legal Conscience.

In Ni�, on March 13, 2004 Professor Milan Petrovi* LL.D. (sgd)

Chief Prosecutor of the

International Tribunal of Legal Conscience

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